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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court of the United 
States decided the landmark case Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 1 The "Erie 
doctrine," which emerged from the case, permits federal courts to apply 
federal procedural rules but requires that substantive issues of law be 
decided in accord with applicable state law.2 Since 1938, the year Erie 
was decided, judges, lawyers, commentators, and law students alike have 
grappled with both the meaning and application of the Erie doctrine. 
Although subsequent Supreme Court pronouncements were intended to 
clear up the confusion, these decisions have produced the opposite result. 
In 1974, in a further attempt at clarification, Professor John Hart 
I. 304 u.s. 64 (1938). 
2. Although it is easy to view Erie as a housekeeping rule for federal courts, the con-
cerns underlying the doctrine are far more serious. The doctrine is premised upon 
principles of federalism, and it exemplifies the perpetual tug-of-war between the de-
sire to uphold state-created rights and obligations and the need to provide a uniform 
and efficient federal judiciary. The Erie doctrine may indeed represent "the very 
essence of our federalism." Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 
693, 695 (1974). 
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Ely published The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 3 an article that is widely 
regarded as the definitive examination of the Erie doctrine. Celebrated 
commentators such as Martin Redish and Carter Phillips,4 Abraham 
Chayes,5 and Peter Westen and Jeffrey Lehman6 have all lent support to 
Professor Ely's position. The Supreme Court, in Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 7 cited Ely's article, but the Court has yet to expressly embrace his 
or any other commentator's position. Nevertheless, to date, Professor 
Ely's views have not been effectively countered, 8 and it is indeed note-
worthy that so many commentators have aligned themselves with his po-
sition in an area where confusion and dissension are so prevalent. 
Furthermore, even those commentators who take issue with Professor 
Ely's treatment of the Erie doctrine generally acknowledge the conven-
tional wisdom of his analysis by specifically addressing his views. Thus, 
due to the stature of Ely's seminal article, and because of our concur-
rence with his views, the authors selected Professor Ely's analysis as the 
benchmark against which to judge lower federal court application of the 
Erie doctrine. The authors use Professor Ely's commentary as a bench-
mark rather than actual Supreme Court precedent because of the incisive 
manner in which Ely treats the complex and often divergent nature of 
the Erie line of cases. 
Although Ely's article has gained a consensus among several leading 
commentators, the federal courts are far from clear on what the Erie 
doctrine means and how it should be applied. It is contended that the 
Erie doctrine is in a state of disarray. Different courts, even when lo-
cated within the same circuit, rarely employ the same analysis when con-
fronted with similar Erie issues. In fact, of the many cases since 1974 
3. Id. Professor Ely was Chief Justice Earl Warren's law clerk at the time Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), one of the principal decisions in the Erie line of cases, 
was decided. Id. at 693 (introductory footnote). 
4. Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate 
Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 357-59 (1977) (arguing that Ely's interpretation 
of Hanna's "modified outcome determination test" is the proper analysis for pur-
poses of the Rules of Decision Act, although unresponsive to the policy concerns 
underlying Erie). 
5. Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1974) (concurring with Ely's 
overall analytic framework but not with the results Ely reached when applying the 
Hanna test to several specific cases). · 
6. Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. 
REv. 311, 362-77 (1980) (concurring with Ely's construction of the Erie tests, but 
arguing that the Supreme Court's current analysis is unsupported by the terms of 
the Rules of Decision Act). 
7. 446 U.S. 740, 751 & n.11 (1980). 
8. Of course, as is the case with most legal theories, Professor Ely's views are not 
universally accepted. See, e.g., Gelfand & Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 
49 U. PITI L. REv. 937, 966 nn. 82-83 (1988) (describing Ely's modified outcome-
determinative test as "one that produces the results Professor Ely would choose"); 
Bourne, Federal Common Law and the Erie-Byrd Rule, 12 U. BALT. L. REv. 426, 
464-68 (1982) (arguing that Ely's "thesis is flawed in ... serious ways," including a 
failure to recognize the continued viability of Byrd's balancing of state and federal 
interests). 
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involving Erie disputes, only a handful have used an analysis that argua-
bly tracks the Supreme Court's standard as interpreted by Professor Ely, 
or any other single standard for that matter. In essence, courts generally 
improvise when resolving Erie issues, and the tests they apply often ap-
pear tailored to reach a predetermined result. This article contends that 
the Erie doctrine is in need of further attention by the Supreme Court 
because the many nuances and subtleties of the doctrine have been lost 
by all but a microcosm of courts and commentators. 
This article surveys federal Erie cases decided since 19749 and exam-
ines how the analyses employed by lower federal courts square with Pro-
fessor Ely's standard. The article concludes with an assessment of why 
the Erie doctrine has proven so difficult for the federal courts to adminis-
ter, and what this may indicate about the doctrine itself and the standard 
advocated by Ely. 
"Erie problems" arise when a federal court is confronted with a di-
rect conflict between a state and federal rule or policy. In the face of 
such conflicts, either the Rules of Decision Act of 1789 (RDA)10 or the 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 (REA) 11 governs. When a conflict exists 
between a state rule or policy and a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP), the REA controls. When the conflict is between a state rule or 
policy and a federal rule or policy other than a FRCP, the RDA governs. 
Professor Ely's thesis is that Erie problems are composed of inquir-
ies having both statutory and constitutional bases. The United States 
Constitution, according to Ely, is "a sort of checklist," with state rights 
comprising everything remaining after the federal powers are checked 
off. 12 There is no "enclave" of state powers independent of those granted 
to the federal government under the Constitution. 13 In Ely's view, article 
III of the Constitution, by providing diversity jurisdiction, granted Con-
gress the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern in-court pro-
ceedings.14 The RDA and REA were intended to keep federal courts 
within their constitutional limits by authorizing application of federal 
procedural rules only. 
9. The Irrepressible Myth of Erie was published in 1974. Ely, supra note 2. Thus, this 
article reviews·cases decided since 1974 which cited Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 
(1965). 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982) [hereinafter RDA]. 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) [hereinafter REA]. 
12. Ely, supra note 2, at 701. 
13. /d. at 701-06. The "enclave theory" of state's rights is based upon the idea that 
there exists a body of independent rights reserved to the states other than those 
which remain after the enumerated federal powers. Ely believed that the "enclave 
theory" was repudiated by Hanna as contrary to the language of the tenth amend-
ment to the Constitution. /d. 
14. /d. at 703-04. Recently, the Court noted that "[a]rticle III ... augmented by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause ... empowers Congress to establish a system of fed-
eral district and appellate courts and, impliedly, to establish procedural Rules gov-
erning litigation in these courts." Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 
(1987). 
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Ely claims that both the RDA and REA established tests that are 
more restrictive than the Constitution itself. Thus, he contends, once 
these tests are met, the Constitution can "remain in the background" 
unless Congress enacts substantive rules of decision for diversity cases. 15 
Relying upon Supreme Court interpretations of the RDA and REA, Ely 
concludes that the proper standard to apply for RDA problems is what 
he terms the "rejuvenated outcome determination test," while REA con-
flicts require application of the two-prong test of the REA. 16 
II. THE RULES OF DECISION ACT 
A. Supreme Court Decisions Interpreting the RDA 
1. The Swift Doctrine 
The RDA provides that "[t]he laws of the several states, except 
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Con-
gress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision 
in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they 
apply." 17 Prior to the Erie decision, the Supreme Court held that the 
phrase "laws of the several states" referred only to state statutes and 
state decisional law construing those statutes and affecting matters of 
"permanent locality." 18 As a practical matter, this construction of the 
RDA, known as the "Swift doctrine," permitted a federal court to create 
"federal general common law" based upon a court's own "independent 
judgment as to what the common law of the state [was] or should [have 
been]" 19 for all areas of conduct not regulated directly by state statute. 
The underlying assumption of Swift, that there would someday be a 
uniform body of national substantive law, never materialized. This fail-
ure was in large part due to state court persistence in adhering to their 
own common law and the difficulty of distinguishing between "local" law 
and "general" law. 20 Moreover, diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, used 
in conjunction with the Swift doctrine, provided forum-shopping oppor-
tunities for noncitizen litigants, and the resulting discrimination worked 
15. Ely, supra note 2, at 698. 
16. /d. at 717-38. For further discussion of the two-prong test of the REA, see infra 
notes 265-77 and accompanying text. 
17. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1982). 
18. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1842). Matters of "permanent locality" 
included rights and obligations with respect to property which were fixed or local in 
nature, such as those embodied in deeds and wills. 
19. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938). Swift was based upon the nineteenth 
century jurisprudential belief that law was discoverable by judges. A contrast was 
drawn between matters of "general law," which the federal courts were free to find 
for themselves, and matters of "local law," for which state decisions were binding. 
The federal "general common law" was perceived to be "a transcendental body of 
law outside of any particular state .... " Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & 
Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See gener-
ally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 54 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter C. 
WRIGHT]; Schulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336 (1938). 
20. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. 
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against citizens of the states in which federal courts sat. 21 These con-
cerns caused the Supreme Court to overturn the doctrine in the now fa-
mous case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 22 
2. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 
In Erie, the plaintiff, Harry Tompkins, was injured by a train in 
Pennsylvania while walking alongside the railroad tracks. Tompkins 
brought suit against Erie Railroad, the owner of the train, in a New York 
district court. 23 The issue in Erie was whether a New York federal court 
sitting in diversity should apply state or "general" federal law in deter-
mining the status of the plaintiff as a trespasser on the property of the 
defendant railroad.24 Under Pennsylvania law, which all parties agreed 
controlled, Tompkins would have been deemed a trespasser who was 
owed no duty of care. Under "general federal common law," however, 
Tompkins was a licensee and thus was owed a duty of care.25 
The Supreme Court held that state common law was a "rule of deci-
sion" within the meaning of the RDA,26 thus overturning the Swift doc-
trine. 27 In so doing, the Court acknowledged that "in applying the 
[Swift] doctrine this Court and the lower courts [had] invaded rights 
21. Diversity jurisdiction was created to protect out-of-state citizens from the perceived 
discrimination and bias of local juries. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 
348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also P. BATOR, P. 
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 18-19 (2d ed. 1973) (hereinafter HART & 
WECHSLER]. Swift, according to Erie, "introduced grave discrimination by non-
citizens against citizens." Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. The most notable example of this 
phenomenon was presented in Black & White Taxicab Co., where a federal district 
court sitting in Kentucky upheld, in the name of "general" law, a monopolistic 
contract that was unenforceable according to Kentucky state law. The Kentucky 
corporate plaintiff had reincorporated in Tennessee solely to establish diversity of 
citizenship with its rival. The absence of federal antitrust law allowed the company 
to maintain a monopoly contrary to state law. Black & White Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 
at 522-25. 
22. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Ely, supra note 2, at 702-05. 
23. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69. 
24. ld. at 71. 
25. Id. at 69-70. 
26. The Court did not address the question of whether choice of laws rules themselves 
were subject to an Erie analysis, although it did note that "the federal court in New 
York was [not] free to disregard the alleged rule of Pennsylvania common law." I d. 
at 71. In assuming that Pennsylvania common law controlled, the Court either 
relied on federal conflicts rules or determined sub silentio that a New York court in 
similar circumstances would have applied Pennsylvania law. This point was clari-
fied in Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), where 
the Supreme Court held that conflict of law rules are not exceptions to the Erie 
doctrine, and courts are to apply whatever law would be applied by the courts of the 
state in which the federal court sits. Id. at 496. 
27. Interestingly, neither party had challenged the Swift doctrine in their briefs. See 
Summary of Briefs in Erie, 304 U.S. at 65-69. Nevertheless, the Erie decision began 
by stating: "The question for decision is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of 
Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved." I d. at 69. 
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which ... are reserved by the Constitution to the several state[s]."28 
Although no constitutional provision was expressly noted, the Erie Court 
stated that "the unconstitutionality of the course pursued" compelled it 
to overturn Swift. 29 Thus the Court disclaimed the existence of "federal 
general common law"30 and held that the RDA required federal courts 
to apply all the law of the states, including common law decisions of state 
courts, except in matters where federal law controlled. 31 
Erie was read by lower federal courts as producing a "substance/ 
procedure" standard whereby substantive state law was to be applied by 
a federal court but procedural issues were to be governed by federal 
law. 32 Interestingly, however, Erie did not actually announce a "sub-
stance/procedure" test for its construction of the RDA. The only basis 
28. /d. at 80. 
29. /d. at 77-78. The "course pursued" under Swift was unconstitutional because 
"nothing in the Constitution provided the central government with a general law-
making authority of the sort the Court had been exercising under Swift." Ely, supra 
note 2, at 703. 
Congress [and the federal courts have] no power to declare substantive 
rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their 
nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. 
And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon 
the federal courts. 
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Thus, Erie rested on the Court's conclusion that Congress 
lacked the power to vest federal courts with authority to create "federal general 
common law," that Congress could not have delegated such lawmaking powers to 
the courts, and that the RDA could not be interpreted to permit such an unconstitu-
tional result. Ely, supra note 2, at 703 n.62. 
The constitutional issue in Erie could have been avoided by simply reinter-
preting the RDA itself, and, in fact, it has been argued that Erie's constitutional 
analysis was dictum. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 360; Clark, State Law in the 
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 
267, 273 n.27 (1946). The Erie Court relied on a much celebrated article by Profes-
sor Charles Warren, in which he disclosed the results of research that had led to his 
discovery of an earlier draft of the RDA. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72-73 (citing Warren, 
New Light on theHistoryoftheFedera/JudiciaryActo/1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 
(1923) [hereinafter Warren]). This earlier draft contained the words "the Statute 
law of the several states in force for the time being and their unwritten or common 
law now in use," in place of the words "laws of the several states." The difference 
between the earlier draft and the final act led Professor Warren to conclude that the 
Swift doctrine was not supported by the terms of the RDA, and that the "laws of 
the several states" were "not intended to be confined to 'statute laws' ... but [were] 
intended to include the common law of a State as well as the statute law." Warren, 
supra, at 51-52, 85-86. 
30. On the same day that Erie was decided, however, the Court grounded another deci-
sion on federal "common law." See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek 
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (apportionment of the waters of interstate streams 
governed by federal common law). 
31. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79. 
32. See, e.g., Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Lee, 168 F.2d 420, 423 (lst Cir. 1948); Ber-
geron v. Mansour, 152 F.2d 27, 28-29 (lst Cir. 1945); Brown v. Cranston, 132 F.2d 
631, 633-34 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943); Cooper v. Brown, 126 
F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1942); Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F.2d 227, 
232 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 672 (1942); Waterman v. The Aakre, 122 
F.2d 469, 474 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 690 (1941). 
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in the opinion to support such a test is the Court's statement that "Con-
gress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law,"33 and 
Justice Reed's statement in his concurrence that "(t]he line between pro-
cedural and substantive law is hazy, but no one doubts federal power 
over procedure. " 34 The substance/procedure formulation is generally 
credited to Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 35 where the Supreme Court stated 
that Congress has the "power to regulate the practice and procedure of 
federal courts ... but it has never essayed to declare the substantive state 
law, or to abolish or nullify a right recognized by the substantive law of 
the state .... " 36 Reliance upon Sibbach by lower courts may have been 
misplaced, however, since the Court's use of the words "substantive" and 
"procedure" were largely in reference to the REA, not the RDA. 37 
"Substance" and "procedure" proved to be elusive concepts, and the 
Supreme Court has made several reformulations of the Erie test, the first 
coming in the case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 38 
3. York Outcome Determination 
York was a class action suit in equity brought by investors alleging 
breach of trust by the defendant, Guaranty Trust Co. The issue facing 
the Court was whether the state statute of limitations barred the action in 
federal court. 39 Application of a substance/procedure analysis would 
have been troublesome, since substance and procedure are often inter-
mingled to create an equity cause of action. Terming the substance/pro-
cedure dichotomy "immaterial" for purposes of the RDA, the York 
Court explained that Erie "was not an endeavor to formulate scientific 
legal terminology. "40 Instead, the Court noted that: 
[T]he intent of [the Erie] decision was to insure that, in all cases 
... the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be 
substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the out-
come of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a state court.41 
This so-called "outcome determination" test required federal courts 
exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply the state rule whenever failure 
to apply that rule would generate different outcomes in state and federal 
33. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). 
34. /d. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring). 
35. 312 u.s. 1 (1941). 
36. /d. at 9-10. Another decision relied upon by lower courts for a substance/procedure 
dichotomy was Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939), which was 
decided one year after Erie. The Court held that state law presumptions applied in 
diversity cases, and in dictum, distinguished issues relating to a "substantial right" 
from issues of "practice." /d. at 212. 
37. See generally Ely, supra note 2, at 708. 
38. 326 U.S. 99 (1945); see also Ely, supra note 2, at 701-02. 
39. York, 326 U.S. at 100-01. 
40. /d. at 109. 
41. /d. 
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court. 42 In York, the Supreme Court applied this test to a state statute of 
limitations and found such a law to be outcome determinative since the 
litigation would have been time-barred in state court but not in federal 
court. 43 Because the state law was deemed outcome determinative, the 
federal court was obliged to apply it. 
The York outcome determination test proved over-inclusive. Erie 
issues typically arise in a diversity action when a party complies with a 
federal rule, but fails to comply with the applicable state rule. Once the 
available state forum has been foreclosed because of noncompliance, any 
rule would literally affect the outcome of the litigation. Since any event 
can be said to affect the outcome, the result of applying the York text is 
that almost all laws are classified as outcome determinative.44 
4. The Byrd Balancing Test 
The Supreme Court attempted to correct the over-inclusiveness of 
the York test in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. 45 In 
a diversity action brought in federal court for injuries resulting from al-
leged negligence, the defendant corporation asserted that it was the plain-
tiff's employer under South Carolina law, and that the plaintiff's 
exclusive remedy lay under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation 
Act.46 Under state law, the issue of whether the plaintiff was a "statu-
tory employee" was a question of fact to be decided by the judge, while 
federal law demanded that the jury act as fact finder. 47 Conceding that if 
"'outcome' [were] the only consideration, a strong case might appear for 
42. The Court framed the test as follows: "The question is whether ... [the state rule] 
significantly affect[s] the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of 
the State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same 
parties in a State court?" /d. Underlying the outcome determination standard are 
basic notions of federalism-federal courts are not intended to be adjuncts of state 
courts and were created to provide a different and unbiased forum for out-of-state 
litigants. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Fed-
eral courts are not meant to provide a different set of legal rules, nor should they 
entertain an action which would otherwise be barred at the state level. 
43. York, 326 U.S. at 110. Use of any Erie analysis was largely unnecessary, for "even 
before [Erie], federal courts relied on statutes of limitations of the States in which 
they sat." /d. 
44. Under the York test, even a purely procedural rule could be outcome-determinative. 
As the Court in Hanna noted, the York outcome determination test would permit a 
diversity litigant to "insist on the right to file subsequent pleadings in accord with 
the time limits applicable in state courts," rather than by the federal timetable, if 
employment of the federal timetable would bar him from bringing suit, and thus 
determine the outcome of the suit. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468-69. Two commentators 
have even implied that a rule prescribing the size of the paper on which a complaint 
is filed could be outcome-determinative under the York formulation. See J. LAND-
ERS & J. MARTIN, CiVIL PROCEDURE 244 n.2 (1981). 
45. 356 u.s. 525 ( 1958). 
46. /d. at 526-27. 
47. /d. at 528-29. Byrd could have been grounded on the seventh amendment right to a 
jury for determining issues of fact. The Court refused to invoke the right to a jury 
trial, however, preferring to base its decision on Erie grounds instead. /d. at 537 
n.IO. 
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saying that the federal court should follow the state practice," the Court 
nevertheless found "affirmative countervailing considerations at work."48 
The Supreme Court held the federal rule applicable because the strong 
"federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions" out-
weighed the state policy giving the judge fact finding powers.49 As a 
result of this language, Byrd came to represent a balancing version of the 
Erie test; federal and state policy interests must be balanced against one 
another to determine which rule should control in a diversity action. 
There are at least two ways of interpreting the Byrd balancing analy-
sis. Under the more common two-stage Byrd balancing analysis, a court 
must initially determine whether the state rule is substantive or proce-
dural. If the rule is "substantive" in the outcome determination sense, 
or, if the rule is "intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights 
and obligations of the parties," no balancing is required.50 If, on the 
other hand, a state procedural law is implicated that "appears to be 
merely a form and mode of enforcing" the substantive rights of the par-
ties, a balancing test must be applied and the stronger interest should 
prevail.5 1 
Language from Byrd lends itself to another type of balancing involv-
ing "countervailing considerations.''52 This interpretation of Byrd re-
quires the courts to weigh the federal interest respecting the influence 
state substantive law has on the outcome of litigation against other fed-
eral interests in promoting a uniform and efficient federal system. 
The Byrd analysis, which attempted to place competing state and 
federal interests on a decision-making scale appropriate to common law, 
suffered from two inherent drawbacks. First, whereas there was a consti-
tutional basis to Erie, no such foundation existed for the Byrd balancing 
test. Second, pushed to its extreme, the Byrd test could require results 
contrary to the spirit of Erie. If, for example, the state interests behind 
one of its purely procedural rules were found to outweigh federal inter-
ests behind a federal procedural rule, the Byrd test appears to mandate 
application of the state rule. 
5. Hanna and Refined Outcome Determination 
Recognizing the inherent difficulties in balancing substantive and 
procedural considerations, the Supreme Court rejuvenated the York out-
come determination test in Hanna v. Plumer. 5 3 The issue in Hanna was 
whether the adequacy of service of process on the defendant was to be 
determined by FRCP 4(d)(l), which authorizes service on any responsi-
48. !d. at 537. 
49. !d. at 538. 
50. !d. at 536. 
51. !d. 
52. !d. at 537-38. 
53. 380 U.S. 460 (1965); see also Ely, supra note 2, at 717-18. Hanna is the opinion 
principally relied upon by Professor Ely in formulating his thesis. 
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ble adult at the defendant's home, or by a Massachusetts rule54 which 
required that the defendant be served in person. 55 Even though Hanna 
involved a conflict between state law and a FRCP, the Court, in dictum, 
reformulated the outcome determination test for RDA conflicts. 56 Nar-
rowing the overly broad York formulation, the Court explained that the 
test could not "be read without reference to the twin aims of Erie : dis-
couragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable adminis-
tration of the laws."57 The majority noted that "not only are 
nonsubstantial, or trivial, variations [between state and federal rules] not 
likely to raise the sort of equal protection problems which troubled the 
Court in Erie; they are also unlikely to influence the choice of a fo-
rum. " 58 The Erie Court did not intend to preclude forum-shopping for 
purposes of efficiency, strategic advantage, or reduced cost-Erie's target 
was forum-shopping for a result based upon differences in the applicable 
substantive law, since the decision sought to prevent "inequitable admin-
istration of the laws."59 
Although the issue at hand in Hanna was one governed by the 
REA, the Court reasoned that the choice between the state in-hand ser-
vice rule and FRCP 4(d)(l) "would be of scant, if any, relevance to the 
choice of a forum. " 60 This was because the plaintiff "was not presented 
with a situation where application of the state rule would wholly bar 
recovery; rather, adherence to the state rule would have resulted only in 
altering the way in which process was served."61 The difference between 
in-hand service and service by mail would have no effect on a litigant's 
choice of forum at the start of the litigation, when all options are open, 
because the way in which a party is served has no bearing on the out-
come of a lawsuit. 
According to Ely's interpretation of Hanna, a state law is deemed 
outcome determinative if, at the start of the litigation, before any avail-
able choices are foreclosed, the nature of the state law is such that its 
application would increase the plaintiff's chances of winning on the mer-
its.62 Framed in this way, outcome determination is no longer over-in-
clusive and leaves no room for the balancing of interests advocated by 
54. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958). 
55. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461-63. 
56. Id. at 467-69. 
57. /d. at 468. 
58. /d. 
59. Professor Ely points out that "forum shopping is not an evil per se. It is evil only if 
something evil flows from it; indeed, the very idea of the diversity jurisdiction was to 
provide an alternative to state court." Ely, supra note 2, at 710. 
60. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469. 
61. /d. 
62. Ely, supra note 2, at 714. Hanna "overruled no prior application of the [outcome 
determination] test and indeed, by dusting it off and adding a couple of qualifica-
tions that should have been there all along, resurrected it from the uncertain situa-
tion in which Byrd had left it. There was nothing wrong with York but 
oversimplification." /d. 
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Byrd.63 
The basis for Ely's claim that policy interests are no longer factors 
in the RDA formula is that Hanna can be read to reject the Byrd balanc-
ing test. In a note, the Court explained that under the Erie doctrine: 
[T]he importance of a state rule is indeed relevant, but only in 
the context of asking whether application of the rule would 
make so important a difference to the character or result of the 
litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly discriminate 
against citizens of the forum State, or whether application of 
the rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of 
one or both· of the litigants that failure to enforce it would be 
likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court. 64 
Thus, according to Ely, the strength of the policy interests behind a rule 
are to be given scant, if any, independent consideration, except to the 
extent that they affect the outcome of the litigation.65 
B. Application of the RDA in the Federal Courts 
In the many RDA cases decided since publication of Professor Ely's 
article in 1974, only a handful of courts referred to refined outcome de-
termination, and even fewer actually employed the analysis. Further-
more, there are instances where refined outcome determination is 
cumbersome to apply or does not produce consistent results. 
1. Issues Resolvable with Refined Outcome Determination 
Most RDA conflicts arise when, in the absence of federal statutory 
law, a federal court is confronted with an applicable state law. Under 
such circumstances, the question whether the court is free to disregard 
the state rule is usually resolvable upon application of the refined out-
come determination test. 
a. Medical Malpractice Tribunals 
One of the most common RDA disputes concerns whether federal 
courts must apply state laws which require ~hat medical malpractice 
63. "When the RDA is interpreted in light of its fairness rationale ... it becomes clear 
that there is no place in the analysis for the sort of balancing of federal and state 
interests contemplated by the Byrd opinion." Ely, supra note 2, at 717 n.130. 
64. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9. 
65. The Hanna opinion, however, is not perfectly clear on this point because it also 
contains language which has prompted lower federal courts and commentators re-
lentlessly to cling to the balancing test. Byrd was cited in the Hanna opinion for the 
proposition that the " 'outcome-determination' analysis was never intended to serve 
as a talisman," and some courts have relied on this language to justify the continued 
use of Byrd balancing. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-67. Such views, however, are con-
trary to a plain reading of Hanna as well as to the views of Ely and other leading 
commentators. See supra note 63; Redish & Phillips, supra note 4, at 369 (concur-
ring with Ely's view that there is no place for the Byrd test after Hanna). 
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claims be heard initially by special state tribunals. These laws, enacted in 
response to the proliferation of medical malpractice suits, are meant to 
discourage frivolous claims and combat the increased costs of malprac-
tice insurance. 
Two district courts within the First Circuit have considered whether 
state laws requiring the presentment of claims to medical malpractice 
tribunals prior to litigation are applicable in diversity suits. In Wheeler v. 
Shoemaker 66 and Byrnes v. Kirby, 67 opposite conclusions were reached, 
and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit then resolved the conflict 
in Feinstein v. Massachusetts General Hospital.6s 
In Wheeler, the District Court of Rhode Island held that a state law 
requiring referral of claims to a medical malpractice tribunal did not 
have to be applied in a diversity case. 69 The applicable Rhode Island 
statute provided that malpractice suits would be initially considered by a 
mediation panel consisting of a special master, a physician, and an attor-
ney. The panel would conduct a full scale evidentiary hearing with the 
power to subpoena witnesses and appoint its own experts in order to re-
view the merits of each malpractice claim. A panel opinion, reduced to 
\Vriting, would state the grounds for the panel's conclusion and upon a 
finding of liability, the amount of damages as well. Either party could 
reject the panel's findings and continue the action in court. All the 
panel's findings, except those related to damages, were admissible as evi-
dence in the subsequent trial. In rejecting the applicability of state law, 
the court reasoned that when the state rule would significantly alter the 
role of the jury in the federal system, the Byrd balancing approach was 
applicable. 70 Since the requirement of mandatory medical malpractice 
arbitration was intended to "strongly influence the jury verdict or cir-
cumvent jury trial altogether,"71 the district court concluded that the 
state law conflicted with, and was outweighed by, the important federal 
interest in preserving the judge/jury relationship and procedural fair-
ness, 72 notwithstanding that the panel was an important component of 
the state system. 73 
In Byrnes, the District Court of Massachusetts reached a result con-
trary to that of the District Court of Rhode Island in Wheeler. A Massa-
66. 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978). 
67. 453 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1978). 
68. 643 F.2d 880 (lst Cir. 1981). 
69. Wheeler, 78 F.R.D. at 225-26. 
70. /d. at 225. 
71. /d. at 225-26. 
72. /d. at 226-28. Although acknowledging that a failure to apply the panel procedures 
would result in inequitable administration of the laws and probably encourage fo-
rum-shopping, the court stated that the state law had "an appearance of unfairness 
to plaintiffs" which was an "evil" to be avoided by federal courts. /d. at 228. The 
Wheeler court also focused upon the administrative difficulties that pre-trial medical 
tribunals would bring to an already overburdened federal docket. /d. at 229. 
73. /d. at 229; cf Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding 
that state law was applicable on policy grounds and distinguishing Wheeler). 
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chusetts statute provided that if the tribunal found for the defendant, the 
plaintiff was required to post a bond as a prerequisite to pursuing the 
action further. The bond was to be payable to the defendant to cover 
court expenses should he prevail. 74 
The Byrnes court disregarded outcome determination entirely and 
held that the policy considerations announced in Hanna required that 
state law be applied.75 The court found that failure to apply the malprac-
tice law would entice plaintiffs to seek a federal forum to avoid the state 
screening process and bonding requirement. Thus, the court concluded 
that it would "simply be inequitable to permit some litigants to bypass 
the procedure of a tribunal hearing."76 In addition, the Byrnes court un-
dertook a Byrd-type balancing analysis and concluded that in the absence 
of federal policy opposing application of the state malpractice statute, 
substantive state policy would be "undermined" if the Massachusetts law 
were not applied. 77 
The inconsistent results reached by the federal district court in 
Wheeler and Byrnes were resolved by the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Feinstein, where the court, although acknowledging that the same 
state statute applied in Byrnes might "have a significant effect on the 
outcome of the litigation,"78 nonetheless deemphasized the importance of 
the outcome determination test and held that the Massachusetts law 
must be applied. 79 
Apparently confused as to the proper test to apply, the Feinstein 
court relied upon the oft-cited "talisman" language ofHanna 80 as a 
springboard for a policy discussion devoid of any actual balancing of the 
respective state and federal interests. 81 The policies considered were 
those of Hanna: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of 
inequitable administration of the laws. In reaching the conclusion that 
state law must be applied, the court stated that to do otherwise would 
74. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West 1985). The Massachusetts tribunal 
consisted of a judge, a doctor, and an attorney. /d. 
75. At one point, the court stated in passing that "[i]t is, of course, possible that the 
final 'outcome' of the litigation might be substantially the same for a medical mal-
practice action brought in federal court ... as it would be for an action brought in 
the state court system." Byrnes v. Kirby, 453 F. Supp. 1014, 1019 (D. Mass. 1978). 
This is the only indication the court gave that it recognized the significance of the 
outcome of the litigation. 
76. ld. 
77. /d. at 1019-20. The court also relied upon Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
337 U.S. 541 (1949) in finding that the state malpractice bond requirement was a 
substantive right of the defendant under Massachusetts law. Id. at 1019. 
78. Feinstein v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880, 886 (1st Cir. 1981). 
79. /d. 
80. Id. at 884. 
81. /d. at 885-87. Apparently, the court was unsure as to whether the "weighing test 
articulated in Byrd should be applied in post-Hanna cases." ld. at 886 n.8. The 
court also relied upon Cohen in the same manner as the Byrnes court. I d. at 885-86; 
see supra note 78. 
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violate Hanna's "twin aims."82 Such reasoning begs the question since 
the court simply assumed what it was trying to prove-that failure to 
apply the Massachusetts malpractice statute would lead to forum-
shopping. 
In Edelson v. Sorice IIi, 83 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals relied 
explicitly upon a policy analysis to hold that the application of a state 
medical malpractice law was required. The court formulated an Erie 
standard from a hodgepodge of policies gleaned from the Erie line of 
cases. 
The Edelson court looked to the policies underlying Erie and York 
outcome determination and rejected the substance/procedure dichotomy 
as a framework which "contributes nothing to reasoned discourse. " 84 
Limiting the holding of Byrd to issues presenting affirmative counter-
vailing federal considerations,85 the court reached three conclusions: (1) 
the state malpractice arbitration panel law rested on "a strong and ex-
plicit state policy"; (2) there were no affirmative countervailing federal 
interests-in fact, the court found a federal policy favoring arbitration; 
and (3) outcome determination survived Byrd.86 The court, relying upon 
York for guidance, was reluctant to treat federal plaintiffs differently 
from state plaintiffs, 87 and drew an analogy between statutes of limitation 
and the medical malpractice arbitration procedures, finding each to be "a 
condition precedent to entry into the state judicial system."88 Thus, the 
court concluded that Erie demanded that federal courts give effect to this 
"condition precedent."89 
82. !d. at 886, 889. 
83. 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979). 
84. !d. at 133. 
85. The Third Circuit read Byrd narrowly, finding that "it implicate[d] no more than 
trial management in federal courts." !d. at 141. 
86. !d. at 138-40. Why the court was concerned with whether outcome determination 
survived Byrd is unclear because the court of appeals never applied the test; in fact, 
in a subsequent case involving the same state medical malpractice law, the court 
explicitly disregarded the results of outcome determination. Stoner v. Presbyterian 
Univ. Hasp., 609 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1979). In Stoner, the court applied the test of 
York and found that the state law did "not affect the ultimate outcome of the litiga-
tion." Id. at 110. The court reasoned that the statute was not outcome-determina-
tive because the law permitted any plaintiff who lost in arbitration to obtain de novo 
review. !d. Thus, even though the court found the state law to be "more proce-
dural than substantive" and "not [to] affect the ultimate outcome of the litigation," 
it nonetheless concluded that the state law could not be disregarded in federal court. 
!d. Rather, the court relied upon the various policy considerations underlying Erie 
that were mentioned in Edelson. !d. at 110-11. 
87. Edelson, 610 F.2d at 133. In the court's words: "Federal plaintiffs seeking medical 
malpractice damages may not have rights superior to state citizen plaintiffs because 
a fundamental notion underlying Erie is that a federal court sitting in diversity 
merely provides an impartial forum, not a different set of legal rules." !d. at 134 
(citing Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 1976)). 
88. !d. 
89. !d. at 135. In another case, Kanouse v. Westwood Obstetrical & Gynecological 
Associates, 505 F. Supp. 129 (D.N.J. 1981), the district court was confronted with 
an issue similar to the one in Edelson. The state rule at issue was a New Jersey rule 
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Although Edelson was noteworthy for its recognition of the continu-
ing viability of outcome determination, the court never actually applied 
the test. The state statute of limitations in York was substantive not be-
cause it was "a condition precedent" to state court entry, but because it 
altered the outcome of the litigation. Many procedural state rules, in-
cluding pleading requirements and service-of-process rules, must be com-
plied with to gain access into state court, yet Erie and its progeny make 
clear that a federal court need not apply these state rules. 
In Davison v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore,90 a decision affirmed per 
curium by the Fourth Circuit, the District Court of Maryland was con-
fronted with a state law which required that actions to recover more than 
$5000 from a health care provider be arbitrated before being brought into 
state court.91 At the outset, while explaining that a proper Erie test en-
tailed a policy analysis, the court rejected outcome determination as un-
workable, and explained that Hanna stood for the proposition that the 
effect of a state rule on a suit's outcome was not "dispositive."92 Never-
theless, the court proceeded to apply a quasi-outcome determination test. 
The outcome determination analysis that the Davison court em-
ployed focused more upon the state rule's effect on the initial stages of 
litigation than on the actual outcome on the merits. The court explained 
that: 
[i]t is clear that the character of litigation would differ drasti-
cally if plaintiffs in Maryland state courts were required to sub-
mit their claims to an arbitration panel prior to bringing suit 
and plaintiffs in this [federal] court were not. Such a difference 
may or may not ultimately affect the result or outcome of the 
litigation. It certainly does, however, change the nature ... of 
the trial, given that the findings of the panel are admissible in a 
trial de novo. 93 
Although this is obviously not a description of refined outcome determi-
nation, the court did recognize that medical malpractice arbitration stat-
which, like the Pennsylvania law addressed in Edelson, set up procedures for screen-
ing medical malpractice cases. N.J. CouRT RuLE 4:21 (1988) (repealed as of Janu-
ary 2, 1989). The court correctly identified the difference between RDA and REA 
analyses, and properly described the refined outcome determination test. Kanouse, 
505 F. Supp. at 130-31. The court explained that "[t]he prevailing test today is the 
modified outcome determinat[ive] test adopted by the Court in Hanna." !d. The 
court also relied upon Ely's commentary for much of this discussion. Then, how-
ever, rather than using the Hanna test that it had set forth, the court relied on the 
Edelson policy analysis to hold that the state malpractice statute must be applied. 
/d. at 132. The reason given by the court was that failure to apply the state mal-
practice statute would lead to forum-shopping and would therefore contravene the 
policies behind the state rule. !d. at 131. 
90. 462 F. Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). 
91. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02 (1984). 
92. Davison, 462 F. Supp. at 780. 
93. /d. (emphasis added). 
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utes might "change the nature" of the litigation.94 The court concluded 
that because arbitration could affect the outcome of the litigation, the 
state law must be applied in a diversity action.95 
In Hines v. Elkhart General Hospital, 96 the Seventh Circuit was 
faced with a state law97 that required panel review prior to instituting a 
medical malpractice suit.98 Utilizing both a Byrd balancing test and a 
York! Hanna analysis, the court held that the state law must be applied 
in federal court. Consequently, the plaintiffs' case was dismissed for fail-
ure to file the complaint with a medical review panel.99 
In its Byrd analysis, the court explained that "application of the [ar-
bitration] Act in the federal district courts of Indiana neither detracts 
from the independence of the federal judicial system nor disrupts the fed-
eral system of allocating functions between judge and jury." 100 Further-
more, the court found that submission of a claim to a medical review 
panel was undeniably an "integral part of the rights and obligations es-
tablished by the Act," and that, unlike the situation in Byrd, application 
of state law could deprive no one of a jury trial. 101 Citing Hanna solely 
for the proposition that the outcome determinative test must be read in 
conjunction with the twin aims of Erie, the court, without further expla-
nation, concluded that application of the state law in federal court was 
"consonant with the promotion of these [Erie] objectives." 102 
94. /d. The court's reasoning appears to have been derived from the Hanna Court's 
concern for the effect of the state rule on the "character or result of the litigation." 
95. /d. In DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Memorial Hosp., 628 F.2d 287 (4th 
Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit applied an analogous Virginia medical malpractice 
arbitration statute but used a rationale which contrasted sharply with Davison. The 
state medical malpractice panel's opinion was "admissible as evidence in any action 
subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of law, but such opinion [would] 
not be conclusive." VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.01-581.8 (1984). The court found that the 
requirements of the act were so "intimately bound up" with the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties as to mandate application of the state law in federal court. Di-
Antonio, 628 F.2d at 290 (citing Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 63 
(4th Cir. 1965)). 
Applying a Byrd balancing test, the court rejected as an "affirmative counter-
vailing federal consideration" claimant's argument that the jury would be unduly 
influenced by the panel opinion. /d. Even though the Byrd test was employed, the 
court distinguished Byrd and explained that "[t]here is no exclusion of the jury as 
there was in Byrd. The panel opinion is admissible for the jury's consideration but it 
is not conclusive." /d. at 291. 
96. 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979). 
97. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2 (Burns 1983 & Supp. 1988). 
98. Hines, 603 F.2d at 647. 
99. /d. 
100. /d. at 648. 
101. /d.; see also Note, Mandatory State Malpractice Arbitration Boards and the Erie 
Problem: Edelson v. Soricelli, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1562 (1980) (York alone does not 
provide a solution; rather, Byrd balancing is necessary to resolve the issue of 
whether a federal diversity court should honor state malpractice arbitration 
requirements). 
102. Hines, 603 F.2d at 649; see also Wells v. McCarthy, 432 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Mo. 
1977) (holding that a state professional malpractice rule must be applied according 
to the "twin aims of Erie"). 
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State laws requiring that medical malpractice claims be heard by an 
independent panel differ both in the procedures employed and in the ulti-
mate effect a panel's decision has on the outcome of a case. Because 
outcome determination is concerned only with results, however, the pro-
cedural differences between these state laws are irrelevant. The preclu-
sive effect of the tribunal's decision is the only relevant factor under the 
refined outcome determination test. 
The majority of state medical malpractice laws treat the panel's de-
cision merely as additional evidence to be weighed by the jury .103 These 
laws are not outcome determinative because the results of state tribunals 
do not prevent a plaintiff from suing, and thus do not affect a plaintiff's 
chances of winning on the merits prior to the initiation of suit. Forum-
shopping to avoid the tribunal occurs primarily for the purpose of guard-
ing against an unforeseen loss which might later tarnish the lawsuit, but 
not to increase one's chances of winning on the merits. 104 
A different result would occur if a state statute, such as that of 
Rhode Island, 105 required malpractice panels to render a determination 
as to the sufficiency of the evidence before trial. These panels are con-
ducted in a formal trial setting, and their findings as to the merits of the 
case are preclusive because a finding against the plaintiff would result in 
dismissal with prejudice. Such laws essentially grant defendants an addi-
tional chance at a directed verdict; thus, any plaintiff would wish to side-
step these screening procedures. A voidance of such laws decreases a 
plaintiff's chances of losing and thus increases the chances of winning on 
the merits. Not only should such state laws be deemed outcome-determi-
103. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6812 (Supp. 1988) (malpractice review panel 
opinion is admissible as prima facie evidence, but such opinion shall not be conclu-
sive); MD. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (D) (1989) (health care arbi-
tration panel opinion is admissible as evidence at trial and presumed to be correct, 
with the burden of proving to the contrary being upon the party rejecting the panel's 
opinion); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.8 (1989) (malpractice review panel's opinion 
is only an item of evidence at the trial and not conclusive as to liability or damages). 
104. Another reason for avoiding malpractice tribunals is convenience, but this type of 
forum-shopping is not prohibited under Erie. See Ely, supra note 2, at 710. 
105. The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, in Hibbs v. 
Yasher, 522 F. Supp. 247 (D.R.I. 1981), reaffirmed Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 
F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978), under an entirely new and substantially different Rhode 
Island statute. The three-person panel was replaced by a judge who had the power 
sua sponte to subpoena records and individuals to supplement the evidence 
presented by the parties. State law required that the panel judge, prior to the start 
of litigation, make a "finding of fact as to whether the evidence, if properly substan-
tiated and viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, would be sufficient to 
raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry," or whether 
plaintiff's case was merely an unfortunate medical result. Hibbs, 522 F. Supp. at 
251. If the finding was one of unfortunate result, the action was dismissed with 
prejudice. Thus, unlike the state law applied in Wheeler, the new statute gave de-
fendants an opportunity for a pre-trial directed verdict. The statute applied in 
Hibbs was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court in Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) and repealed by the state 
legislature in 1985. 
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native in the Hanna sense, but because the panels are "likely to [consti-
tute] the decisive battle between the litigants," 106 the laws also 
significantly affect the character of the litigation. 
b. Door-Closing Statutes 
In Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 107 the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that a South Carolina "door-closing" statute108 did not bar 
suit in federal court although suit would have been barred if brought in 
state court. 109 The court announced a test for resolving the Erie issue 
that combined a Byrd-type balancing analysis with a York outcome de-
termination test. First, the court, relying upon Byrd, deemed it necessary 
to determine if the state rule was "intimately bound up with a state right 
or obligation," for if it was, it would have to be applied. If the state rule 
failed this first prong, the York outcome determination test was then ap-
plied. If application of the state rule would substantially affect the out-
come of the litigation, the court would have to apply the rule as long as 
there were no "affirmative countervailing federal considerations." 110 The 
Szantay decision is treated by district courts within the Fourth Circuit as 
the authoritative pronouncement on Erie. 111 
By placing such a great emphasis upon policy concerns, Szantay 
substantially undercut outcome determination, and at best, was a mis-
conceived combination of York and Byrd. 112 The Szantay test, however, 
106. Wheeler, 78 F.R.D. at 222. 
107. 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965). 
108. The South Carolina "door-closing" statute prevents a nonresident plaintiff from su-
ing a foreign corporation on a foreign cause of action in South Carolina state court. 
Szantay, 349 F.2d at 62 (discussing S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-214 (Law. Co-op. 1962)). 
109. /d. at 63. 
110. /d. at 63-64. 
Ill. See, e.g., Davison v. Sinai Hosp., 462 F. Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd, 617 F.2d 
361 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Rollins v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 
1137 (D.S.C. 1979), rev'd, 634 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1980); Richards & Assoc. v. 
Boney, 604 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D.N.C. 1985). 
112. The Fourth Circuit has long been maligned for its understanding of the Erie doc-
trine. In large part, this is because of the Circuit's "laundry-list" paraphrase of the 
Erie doctrine in Szantay. The Szantay decision has been criticized by commentators 
and courts alike. Professor Ely cites Szantay for the proposition that the Fourth 
Circuit does not understand the Erie doctrine in light of Hanna. Ely, supra note 2, 
at 717 n.l30. Two other commentators have said: "The important point to note 
from Szantay is the court's indiscriminate use of analysis derived from Byrd and 
Hanna without any overt concern for the fact that its discussion was invoking two 
different versions of Byrd and a potentially inconsistent one from Hanna." Redish 
& Phillips, supra note 4, at 370-71. Even one district court within the Fourth Cir-
cuit has noted its displeasure with the Szantay case. In Rollins, the United States 
District Court for the District of South Carolina only reluctantly followed Szantay 
in holding that the same door-closing statute at issue in Szantay was to be applied in 
diversity actions. Recognizing that Szantay "has sparked much debate among 
members of the bench and bar in South Carolina" the court hesitantly concluded 
that it was required to adhere to precedent "until modified by higher authority." 
478 F. Supp. at 1149-52. 
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has been adopted by at least one other federal circuit. 113 
In Miller v. Davis, 114 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was 
presented with the issue of whether to apply a state rule of subject-matter 
jurisdiction that prohibited the state courts from entertaining actions in-
volving out-of-state trusts. 115 Recognizing the issue as an RDA problem, 
the court cited Byrd and Hanna and erroneously concluded that Hanna 
"laid to rest" strict application of the outcome determination test. 116 Re-
lying upon the oft-criticized Fourth Circuit opinion of Szantay, 117 the 
court developed a tripartite test for determining whether a federal court 
should apply a state rule "when it is enforcing rights created by state 
law." 118 The court explained, "[i]n view of the federal interest favoring 
subject-matter jurisdiction and the minimal-if existent-state policy 
disfavoring it," the state law need not be applied by the district court. 119 
Courts in other circuits have also grappled with door-closing stat-
utes. For example, in American Sheet Metal v. EM-KAY Engineering 
Co., 120 which involved a suit between an unlicensed subcontractor and a 
contractor for breach of contract, the issue confronting the federal dis-
trict court was whether to apply a California law that required contrac-
tors bringing suit for the collection of contractual obligations to prove 
that they were duly licensed. 121 Although the court found that the stat-
ute, on its face, "purports to deal with how actions are pled, and the 
113. See Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974). 
114. /d. 
liS. /d. at 310. 
116. /d. at 313. The court cited to the section of the Hanna opinion containing the REA 
analysis for the proposition that outcome determination did not survive Hanna. 
117. See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text. The court also relied upon Atkins 
v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970) (en bane). 
118. Miller, 507 F.2d at 314. The test the court adopted was quite similar to Szantay's 
"laundry-list" approach: 
/d. 
l. If the state provision is the substantive right or obligation being as-
serted, the federal court must apply it. 
2. If the state provision is a procedural rule which is intimately bound up 
with the substantive right or obligation being asserted, the federal court 
must apply it. 
3. If the state provision is a procedural rule which is not intimately bound 
up with the substantive right or obligation being asserted, but its appli-
cation might substantially change the outcome of the litigation, the fed-
eral court should determine whether state interPsts in favor of applying 
the state rule outweigh countervailing federal considerations against 
application of the rule. If the state interests predominate, the state rule 
should be adopted. 
119. /d. at 318. 
120. 478 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Ca. 1979). 
121. The California statute provides: 
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contrac-
tor, may bring or maintain any action in any court of this state for the 
collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract for 
which a license is required ... without alleging and proving that he was a 
duly licensed contractor. · 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 7031 (West 1975). 
1989] Myth of Erie 423 
jurisdiction of the state court," it held nevertheless that the state rule 
tended not to discriminate against nonresidents and therefore should be 
applied. 122 Furthermore, although the court concluded that the state law 
was not outcome-determinative, it reasoned that outcome determination 
was not "rigid" and must yield in "appropriate cases." 123 
As an example of a circumstance when outcome determination must 
yield, the court pointed to service of process, a purely procedural act and 
one governed by the Federal Rules. This example reveals two ways in 
which this court's comprehension of the Erie doctrine departs from the 
dictum of Hanna. First, since refined outcome determination makes it 
clear that service of process rules are not outcome-determinative, the 
California district court appears to have used York outcome determina-
tion. Second, and more importantly, the fact that the court would con-
sider using outcome determination to decide a conflict between a Federal 
Rule and a state rule indicates the court's misunderstanding of Hanna in 
general. 
Nonetheless, even if the court had applied the refined outcome de-
termination RDA test, it would have reached the same result. The door-
closing statute was outcome-determinative because the plaintiff, who was 
an unlicensed contractor at the start of the litigation, was precluded from 
suing in state court. Thus Erie conflicts involving door-closing statutes 
will always involve cases where it is· possible to sue in a federal forum but 
not in a state forum, and thus choice of the federal forum is always out-
come-determinative in the Hanna sense. 124 
c. Res Judicata Rules 
In Harrison v. Celotex Corp., 125 a Tennessee district court was 
presented with the issue of whether to apply state or federal res judicata 
rules. While the federal rule conferred discretion upon the court to de-
termine whether offensive nonmutual preclusion should be applied, the 
state rule required mutuality of estoppel before offensive collateral estop-
pel could be invoked. 126 After explaining that the issues were complex 
because many competing interests had to be balanced, 127 the court an-
nounced two separate tests to resolve the problem. The first was based 
on the Byrd balancing analysis, and the other was allegedly taken from 
Hanna. 128 
The court's Byrd analysis began with the explanation that the claim 
upon which plaintiff's motion depended was federally-created because it 
122. American Sheet Metal, 478 F. Supp. at 811. 
123. !d. 
124. See Ely, supra note 2, at 727-28. 
125. 583 F. Supp. 1497 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). 
126. !d. at 1498. 
127. !d. at 1499. 
128. !d. at 1501-02. 
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was based solely upon the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment. 129 
The court drew three conclusions: (1) because the right was federally-
created, it could not be bound up with state-created rights and obliga-
tions; (2) there was a federal policy favoring federal court determination 
of the scope of its own judgments; and (3) refusal to apply the state law 
was not necessarily outcome-determinative. 130 In its only use of Hanna, 
the court was content to explain that application of federal law would not 
jeopardize the "twin aims of Erie as identified in Hanna," since there was 
no danger of forum-shopping and the application of federal law could not 
result in the inequitable administration of the laws. 131 
Two of these conclusions are flawed. The fact that a right was fed-
erally-created does not mean that it cannot conflict with state-created 
rights. Using the court's reasoning, Erie conflicts might never be found: 
any right of federal origin could not be bound up with state-created 
rights, and vice-versa. Such an "analysis" allows the court, in essence, to 
avoid the conflict itself. 
While the Harrison court used an outcome determination test, its 
reliance on Byrd rather than York or Hanna is questionable. 132 Harrison 
is an example of a decision which interpreted Byrd as balancing the out-
come-determinative effect of the state rules against the federal policies 
implicated. 133 Such an analysis implicitly rejects Ely's position that 
Hanna rejuvenated York's outcome determination test and dismissed 
Byrd's balancing analysis. 
In Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 134 the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia also was presented with an Erie/res judicata prob-
lem. 135 The state rule provided that the doctrine of res judicata would 
not bar a second suit while an appeal was pending, 136 yet the federal rule 
129. /d. at 1501. When applying an Erie analysis, courts tend to examine whether a right 
or cause of action was federal or state in origin. Although this might, at first glance, 
seem a logical way to begin the analysis, the origin of the right, assuming one exists, 
is of no practical relevance for the Erie test. 
130. /d. 
131. /d. at 1502. 
132. The court stated that in Byrd, outcome determination "was not so strong as to re-
quire the federal policy to yield." /d. at 1501. 
133. See Chladek v. Sterns Transp. Co., 427 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
134. 707 F.2d 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
135. Two other cases in the District of Columbia Circuit involve Erie/res judicata issues, 
but neither raise true Erie problems. See Answering Serv., Inc. v. Egan, 728 F.2d 
1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Semler v. Psychiatric Inst. of Washington, D.C., 575 F.2d 
922 (D.C. Cir. 1984). These cases presented conflicts between two state res judicata 
rules rather than between a state and a federal rule. Although the court found both 
cases to be governed by the Erie doctrine, the decisions should have been controlled 
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In fact, in a concurrence to Egan, then circuit 
court Judge Joseph Scalia noted that there was no reason for an Erie analysis be-
cause there was no conflict between a state and federal law. Egan, 728 F.2d at 1507 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
136. The state rule was that of Florida, where a defamation action was initially brought 
by E. Howard Hunt against a newspaper publisher for an article linking him with 
the assassination of President Kennedy. Hunt, 707 F.2d at 1494. 
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barred such a suit. 137 Using a York-type outcome determination test, the 
court held that application of federal law to the issue would have no 
"substantial bearing on whether the litigation would come out one way 
in the federal court and another way in the state court." 138 Conse-
quently, the court reasoned, the federal rule was not outcome determina-
tive and must therefore be applied. 139 
The test employed by the court inverts the refined outcome determi-
nation test. Outcome determination is meant to be applied to state, not 
federal law; if the state law is not outcome determinative, then it need not 
be applied by a federal court. But in Hunt, the court found that because 
the federal law was not outcome-determinative, it must be applied in fed-
eral court. 
The primary emphasis of the Hunt court was upon Byrd policy con-
siderations. Applying a balancing analysis, the court of appeals noted 
that the strongest interest a federal judicial system "can have is that of 
determining the scope of its judgments." 140 Therefore, the court rea-
soned that the federal interest in maintaining an independent judiciary 
outweighed the rights and obligations of the parties under state law. 141 
When an Erie dispute involves res judicata issues, a particularly 
complex problem emerges. As the context of the problem varies, state 
res judicata rules can be outcome-determinative. An important question 
is when the refined outcome determination test should be applied: 
should a court look to the start of the original action in Forum I or to the 
subsequent action in Forum II. In diversity actions, different results may 
be obtained in cases brought first in state court (Forum I), with the sub-
sequent action in federal court (Forum II) than in cases brought in two 
different federal courts. 142 
While a case is still in Forum I, the rules of res judicata can never be 
deemed outcome-determinative. At the initiation of litigation, a plain-
tiff's chances of winning on the merits cannot be affected by the use of 
that forum's res judicata rules. By definition, res judicata is only applica-
ble when claims or issues are relitigated, and thus will not be considered 
when a plaintiff initiates suit. 
137. /d. at 1497. 
138. !d. at 1496. 
139. !d. 
140. !d. 
141. !d. at 1496-97. Some courts and commentators are of the view that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, not the Erie doctrine, controls the resolution of res judicata 
problems in Erie-type conflicts. See, e.g., Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, 
Inc., 497 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1974) (ignoring Erie and viewing the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause and 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the implementing statute, as controlling); 
Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 750-55 ( 1976) (Erie is a "red 
herring" in the context of res judicata; instead, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is 
controlling). The issue is further complicated by the Supreme Court's failure to 
confront it. See Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1946). 
142. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal 
Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1725 n.IO (1968). 
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When the parties attempt to relitigate a case in Forum II, however, 
res judicata rules are more relevant. Any time state and federal preclu-
sion laws conflict, and application of one would permit the second suit 
while application of the other would preclude it, the state law may be 
deemed outcome-determinative. Such a result is inevitable if refined out-
come determination is meant to be applied at the start of the suit in Fo-
rum II. If, however, outcome determination is intended to be applied at 
the onset of all litigation, that is, at the start of suit in Forum I, res 
judicata rules are never outcome determinative for the same reasons they 
are not before judgment is rendered in Forum I. 
d. Terms in a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Defined by State Law 
In Kreindler v. Marx, 143 an Illinois district court was confronted 
with an interesting RDA issue involving a derivative suit brought under 
FRCP 23.1. The court explained that FRCP 23.1 requires that a plaintiff 
be a shareholder both at the time the transaction at issue occurred and at 
the commencement of the action. 144 The question before the court was 
whether the status of a shareholder to maintain a derivative suit under 
FRCP 23.1 was a substantive issue to be determined by reference to state 
law. 145 Without explaining how state law defined "shareholder," the dis-
trict court nevertheless held that state law governed that definition under 
FRCP 23.1. 146 In so doing, the district court disregarded Seventh Cir-
cuit precedent which had held that the issue was a procedural one to be 
controlled by federallaw. 147 The Kreindler court reasoned, through the 
use of a Byrd analysis, that application of state law was "the better view 
because there [was] no strong federal interest in establishing a uniform 
federal definition of 'shareholder' for purposes of diversity suits." 148 
Although the Kreindler court reached the result supported by vari-
ous commentators, 149 it did so without regard to the refined outcome 
determination test. Under an outcome determination analysis, the court 
would have also concluded that the state rule defining "shareholder" was 
substantive and therefore controlling in federal court, because at the on-
set, the plaintiffs' chances of winning a derivative suit on the merits 
would be nonexistent if they could not even be certified as "sharehold-
143. 85 F.R.D. 612 (N.D. Ill. 1979). 
144. !d. at 614. 
145. !d. 
146. !d. 
147. H.F.G. Co. v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 162 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1947). The H.F.G. 
case, where the Seventh Circuit held that the definition of "shareholder" under Rule 
23.1 was controlled by federal law, has been criticized by several commentators. See 
38 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & ]. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.1, at 
17 n.14 (2d ed. 1985); 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1827, at 37-28 (1982). 
148. Kreindler, 85 F.R.D. at 614 n.5. 
149. See supra note 147. 
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ers" for purposes of FRCP 23.1. Thus the state rule here could easily be 
viewed as outcome-determinative. 
e. Forum-Selection Clauses 
In Dick Proctor Imports, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 150 a Missouri dis-
trict court considered the enforceability of a contract's choice-of-forum 
provision. 151 A 118 year-old Missouri Supreme Court decision 152 had 
held that such clauses divested state courts of jurisdiction and were 
therefore against public policy. 153 In ignoring state precedent, the Dick 
Proctor court found the venue provision to be "a matter ofprocedure." 154 
The Dick Proctor court relied upon a substance/procedure dichot-
omy and held that federal common law governed the question of whether 
the provision was unreasonable or unjust. 155 By simply classifying the 
issue to be "a matter of procedure," the court avoided what should have 
been its first inquiry--determining "the favor with which Missouri courts 
would presently look upon venue limitation provisions." 156 If the Mis-
souri Supreme Court, presented with the same issue, would have over-
ruled its earlier precedent, no Erie conflict would have existed, as both 
federal and state law would have recognized the enforceability of forum-
selection clauses. 
Another forum-selection clause was examined in Stewart Organiza-
tion, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 157 in which a plurality of five judges of the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that contractual choice-
of-forum clauses were enforceable in diversity actions even though such 
150. 486 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Mo. 1980). 
151. /d. at 818. 
152. Reichard v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 31 Mo. 518 (1862). 
153. /d. at 521. The Supreme Court has taken a different view on the validity of forum-
selection clauses: 
Although this view apparently still has considerable acceptance, other 
courts are tending to adopt a more hospitable attitude toward forum-selec-
tion clauses. This [latter] view ... is that such clauses are prima facie 
valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown ... to be 'unrea-
sonable' under the circumstances. 
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I, lO (1972). 
154. Dick Proctor, 486 F. Supp. at 818. 
155. /d. The court's conclusion, based on the idea of a general federal common law of 
contracts in diversity cases, contravenes Erie's denial of the existence of a general 
federal common Jaw. Without such common law, state law clearly governs. See 
also General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, 783 F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 
1986) (holding that state law governs because "the interpretation of forum-selection 
clauses in commercial contracts is not an area of Jaw that ordinarily requires federal 
courts to create substantive law"); Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672 F. 
Supp. 977, 982 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (relying upon General Eng'g in holding that the 
enforceability of forum-selection clauses was a contracts question to be governed by 
state law). 
156. /d. It is important to note, however, that federal common law still governs the 
enforceability of choice-of-venue provisions in federal question and admiralty cases. 
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 14. 
157. 810 F.2d 1066 (lith Cir. 1987) (en bane), a.ff'd, 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
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clauses were violative of state common law. 158 The court determined 
that since "venue in a diversity case is manifestly within the province of 
federal law," choice-of-forum issues, which are analogous to those con-
cerning venue, are likewise controlled by federallaw. 159 No traditional 
Erie analysis was employed; rather, the court looked to the various fed-
eral rules governing venue, including federal statutes, 160 the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 161 and federal case law, 162 to demonstrate that 
there existed a federal interest in enforcing forum-selection clauses. 163 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit in Stewart, 
although "under somewhat different reasoning." 164 Finding that the fed-
eral diversity statute "was sufficiently broad to control the issue of 
venue," the court held that application of the federal statute was man-
dated by the Supremacy Clause. 165 Therefore, according to the Court, a 
state's common law prohibition against the enforcement of forum-selec-
tion clauses should simply be viewed as one of several factors that Con-
gress has instructed federal courts to weigh in resolving motions for 
transfer of venue. 166 Because an Act of Congress was construed broadly 
enough to cover the dispute, the Court adeptly side-stepped the potential 
RDA confiict. 167 
158. /d. at 1067-68. 
159. /d. at 1068. 
160. The court pointed to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982) (Congress has provided venue rules 
for the federal courts by statute). Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1068. 
161. The court stated that Federal Rules 12(b)(3) and 4l(b) "direct the federal courts as 
to the principles involved in deciding questions of venue." 810 F.2d at 1068. 
162. /d. at 1068-69. The court cited two cases: National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 
375 U.S. 311 (1964) and The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
Although both Szukhent and Bremen stand for the proposition that federal courts 
may enforce "reasonable" forum-selection clauses, these cases are not controlling 
here. Szukhent, although a diversity action, concerned the propriety of a clause 
designating an agent for service of process in an adhesion contract and did not reach 
the issue of venue presented by a forum-selection clause. Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 313 
n.2. Bremen, on the other hand, is an admiralty case whose general rule that forum-
selection clauses are enforceable absent unreasonable circumstances may not be ap-
plicable to diversity suits. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9-12. 
163. Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1068-69; see also Allied Prod. Corp. v. Trinidad Petroleum 
Corp., 570 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (federal law governs issues concerning 
venue). 
164. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
165. /d. at 26-27. 
166. /d. at 30. 
167. In a footnote the Court explained: 
If no federal statute or Rule covers the point in dispute, the district court 
then proceeds to evaluate whether application of federal judge-made law 
would disserve the so-called "twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement 
of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the 
laws." If application of federal judge-made law would disserve these two 
policies, the district court should apply state Jaw. 
/d. at 27 n.6 (citations omitted). 
Justice Scalia, in dissent, avoided the Supremacy Clause issue altogether. 
Rather, Justice Scalia, falling victim to a trap which has claimed numerous other 
prey, applied the so-called "twin aims test" to find that state law controlled the 
1989] Myth of Erie 429 
Application of refined outcome determination in Stewart should 
have led to a different result than that reached by the Supreme Court and 
the Eleventh Circuit. A forum-selection clause is not outcome determi-
native, for, unlike door-closing statutes, it permits plaintiffs to have their 
day in court, albeit in a different forum. Forum-selection clauses are 
used primarily for convenience, so the outcome of the suit is unaffected 
by their enforcement. Furthermore, if forum-shopping for a favorable 
result is the chief evil Erie sought to preclude, then forum-shopping 
merely for convenience should not be prohibited. 
f Jury Size 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Palmer v. Ford Motor 
Co., 168 was confronted with a conflict concerning jury size. A state law 
requiring a twelve-person jpry in civil cases conflicted with a local dis-
trict court rule permitting civil juries of six. 169 In holding federal law 
applicable, the court reasoned that the state rule on jury size was not 
bound up with state created rights and obligations, and therefore if it 
were applied, the state rule would "infringe on the functions and charac-
teristics of the federal system." 170 The Palmer court also found that the 
failure to apply the state rule would neither affect the outcome of the 
litigation171 nor violate the twin objectives of Erie, and noted that FRCP 
48 favored application of the district court rule. 172 
From the factors weighed by the court, the issue was viewed as one 
controlled by the RDA. Under the RDA, a state jury-size rule is almost 
certainly not outcome-determinative. A litigant is no more likely to win 
or lose with a six-person jury than with a twelve-person jury, and thus, 
the size of the jury cannot significantly affect the result. The court there-
fore applied the correct rule, albeit for the wrong reasons. 
Treating FRCP 48 as simply another interest to be considered, the 
court did not address the potential REA problem. Neither did it con-
sider the more difficult issue brought to light: the potential REA conflict 
between FRCP 48 and state rules requiring twelve-person juries. If, pur-
suant to FRCP 48, the parties do not stipulate to a reduction in jury size, 
there is no conflict with the state rule, because application of either rule 
results in a jury of twelve. If, however, the parties do stipulate to less 
than twelve jurors under FRCP 48, they probably have waived their state 
right to a twelve-person jury. A conflict would exist only if the state 
question of the validity of a forum-selection clause. /d. at 39-41 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). The "twin aims" of Erie as announced in Hanna, however, simply represented 
the goals of a proper RDA analysis rather than an actual method of analysis. 
168. 498 F.2d 952 (lOth Cir. 1974). 
169. /d. at 954. 
170. /d. at 955. 
171. "The outcome of the litigation will not be substantially different when the jury has 
six, rather than 12, members." Palmer, 498 F.2d at 955. 
172. /d. Federal Rule 48 provides that "[t]he parties may stipulate that the jury shall 
consist of any number less than twelve." 
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rights were deemed unwaivable. 173 
g. Jury Vote 
In Masino v. Outboard Marine Corp., 174 a state rule requiring a five-
sixths majority for a jury verdict conflicted with a federal rule requiring a 
unanimous verdict. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, relying 
on Byrd and York, concluded that the strong federal interest in unanim-
ity outweighed countervailing state policy considerations. 175 In holding 
the federal rule applicable, the Masino court noted that: 
The concern with forum shopping in this case is minimal be-
cause the appellants brought suit in federal court even though 
they had notice that the federal verdict requirement would very 
likely differ from the one they advocated·. This action therefore 
demonstrates that the rule chosen is not so determinative as to 
dictate choice of forum.I 76 
This type of Monday-morning quarterbacking turns the York outcome-
determinative test on its head. Rather than looking to the potential out-
comes to see if they would differ, the court begged the question by finding 
that the plaintiff's selection of federal court indicated an intention to be 
bound by federal law, and therefore, that state law was not outcome-
determinative. 
The Masino court also ignored a compelling argument that the state 
rule requiring a five-sixths majority was substantive under the refined 
outcome-determinative test and should be applied in diversity actions. 
With only a five-sixths majority needed to win, so the argument goes, the 
chances of winning in state court are mathematically better (and known 
to be so at the start of litigation) than the chances of winning in federal 
court. Thus the state law is outcome-determinative in the refined Hanna 
sense. 177 
173. If the parties could not waive their rights to a jury numbering less than twelve, then 
it appears that an unavoidable REA conflict would be presented. Since it is doubt-
ful that FRCP 48 would be found to "abridge, enlarge or modify" any state substan-
tive rights under the REA, the Federal Rule would govern. For a discussion of the 
proper REA standard, see infra notes 252-277 and accompanying text. 
174. 652 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981). 
175. /d. at 331-32. Curiously, the court of appeals explained that "[t]he federal interest 
in unanimity, although not rising to constitutional dimensions, is cloaked in a strong 
tradition .... " /d. at 332. This analysis makes apparent that the court chose to 
ignore Hanna's apparent break with "tradition." 
176. /d. at 332. 
177. A similar issue was avoided by the district court in Wieser v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 69 F.R.D. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). A state law which permitted a five-sixths 
jury vote was in conflict with the federal rule requiring a unanimous vote. The 
district court applied the federal rule based on the law of the case doctrine. /d. at 
101. The court indicated, however, that if it were to have decided the issue, the 
principles of Byrd would have controlled its decision. /d. 
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h. Phantom Party Concept 
Hefley v. Textron, Inc. 178 represents one of the rare RDA issues 
where there was an actual federal rule in conflict with a state rule. 179 
Under a Kansas comparative negligence law, 180 joint tortfeasors could be 
joined as parties for purposes of measuring the extent of their liability 
notwithstanding that one or the other could be immune from suit. Tex-
tron, pursuant to state law, sought to join two immune third-party de-
fendants to a products liability action in federal court. 181 Relying on the 
federal "phantom party" doctrine, the court refused to formally join the 
two immune defendants by name and permitted a determination of the 
phantom parties' proportionate liability. 182 
Textron had made a compelling argument that application of the 
federal doctrine would adversely affect the scope of its discovery "be-
cause discovery from a non-party is more limited than that available 
from a party .... " 183 In rejecting Textron's argument, the court ex-
plained that "to any extent that inclusion of the [immune parties] would 
allow more extensive discovery, which presumably would provide evi-
dence that would persuade the jury to assign a lesser degree of fault to 
Textron, we conclude that the effect on the outcome of the case is 
trivial. " 184 
Although the Hefley court recognized the continued viability of out-
come determination after Hanna, it did not recognize the refined test. 185 
The ultimate issue is whether state rules that permit the joinder of im-
mune parties by name are substantive. Such rules could be considered 
outcome-determinative from defendant's standpoint in that the joinder of 
the immune parties may reduce defendant's proportionate share of liabil-
ity, thus significantly affecting the result. The outcome determination 
test is applied from the plaintiff's point of view, however, because de-
fendants have no initial opportunity to forum-shop. 186 The joinder of the 
178. 713 F.2d 1487 (lOth Cir. 1983). 
179. Most RDA issues involve whether to apply a state rule or policy in the absence of a 
conflicting federal rule or policy. 
180. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(c) (1976). 
181. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1497. The two other parties were the United States Government 
and the Kansas Army National Guard. /d. 
182. /d. at 1496-97. Under the Kansas comparative negligence statute, "an otherwise 
immune party may nevertheless be joined ... for the purposes of assessing compara-
tive fault." ld. at 1496. Joinder in such a situation, however, is not authorized 
under the Federal Rules. Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 
750 (D. Kan. 1978). Thus, to fill the void left by the Federal Rules, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court in Kansas created the "phantom party" concept, allowing a jury to con-
sider the proportionate fault of immune joint tortfeasors without formally joining 
those tortfeasors as defendants. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1496. 
183. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1497. 
184. /d. "As the [Supreme] Court stated in [York], and reaffirmed in Hanna, the out-
come of a case should be substantially the same in state and federal court." /d. 
(citations omitted). 
185. /d. 
186. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982), defendants have the opportunity to forum-shop by 
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"phantom parties" may potentially decrease the non-immune defendant's 
liability. Consequently, the plaintiff's chances of collecting more from 
the non-immune party are decreased if state law is applied and the 
"phantom parties" are joined by name. The state law is outcome-deter-
minative in the refined sense since it significantly affects the outcome. 
i. Notice for Wrongful Death Claim 
In the recent case of Lundgren v. McDaniel, 187 the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit confronted an RDA issue involving a Florida 
wrongful death statute. 188 The state rule required that the plaintiff give 
written notice to the Florida Department of Insurance when bringing a 
wrongful death claim against the state; the Department then had six 
months within which to accept or reject the claim. 189 In Lundgren, the 
plaintiff gave written notice but filed suit prior to expiration of the six-
month period. 190 The lower court permitted the plaintiff to amend the 
complaint in order to avoid a motion to dismiss for failure to abide by the 
notification requirement. 191 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision, admitting that it was 
unaware of how a state court would have treated the issue. 192 The court 
explained, however, that "even if Florida law requires ... a trial court to 
dismiss a complaint filed less than six months after notice, such a Florida 
rule would be procedural for purposes of the Erie doctrine." 193 This con-
clusion was based upon the court's belief that failure to apply the state 
rule would not result in "forum shopping [or] inequitable administration 
of justice" since the complaint could be refiled if dismissed in state court 
for noncompliance with the notice requirements. 194 
Although the Lundgren result was in accord with the results ob-
tained under the outcome determination test, the means employed by the 
court were not. The Florida notice requirement was passed for the pur-
pose of conserving judicial resources by requiring a plaintiff to give the 
state time to offer a settlement and avoid litigation. Although these goals 
might have substantive ends, the state rule is not outcome-determina-
tive.195 At the onset of litigation, when all options are still available to a 
Florida plaintiff, the chances of winning in state court under the Florida 
wrongful death notice requirements are no different from the chances of 
removal of the suit from state to federal court. The outcome-determinative test, 
however, is only applied at the initiation of suit and not at this stage of the litigation. 
187 .. 814 F.2d 600 (11th Cir. 1987). 
188. Id. at 605. 
189. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 768.28(6) (West 1986 & Supp. 1987). 
190. Lundgren, 814 F.2d at 605. 
191. /d. 
192. /d. at 606. 
193. /d. 
194. Id. 
195. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 2, at 716 (rules which prescribe "the method by which an 
adversary is given notice" are not outcome-determinative). 
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winning in federal court without such requirements. The state rule only 
affects when suit can be brought in Florida court, not the results of the 
case. 
j. Tolling Rules 
In Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 196 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, using a unique balancing 
test, 197 held that a state tolling rule must be applied by a federal court in 
a diversity case. 198 The court found that the policy concerns underlying 
state tolling rules were similar to those of the statutes of limitations 
which the tolling rules were designed to suspend. 199 If the state tolling 
provisions were not applied, the court reasoned that it "would be tamper-
ing with [the] policy choices" made when the state legislature determined 
the length of the state statute of limitations. 200 Moreover, the court con-
cluded, the policies underlying Erie 201 would be subverted if federal 
courts were allowed to freely disregard state tolling rules. 202 
The result in Walko would have been different under the refined 
outcome determination test. At the outset of litigation, before any op-
tions concerning forums have been foreclosed, tolling rules generally do 
not influence the choice of a forum because such rules have no effect on a 
litigant's chances of winning on the merits. Therefore, state tolling rules 
need not be applied by a federal court. 
196. 554 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
197. The court's balancing test "hinge[ d] on the degree to which state policies, other than 
those primarily directed to administration of the state judicial system, would be 
impeded by displacement of the state rule by federal common law." /d. at 1170; cf 
Redish & Phillips, supra note 4, at 370-71 (Walko court employed "two wholly 
independent approaches-that of Hanna and that of Byrd-for deciding the [RDA] 
issue."). 
The District of Columbia Circuit has on other occasions shown an affinity to-
wards balancing policy interests. See, e.g., Department of Defense v. Federal Labor 
Relations Auth., 659 F.2d 1140, 1151 n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Byrd for the 
refinement of the Erie doctrine, and Hanna for the proposition that the substance/ 
procedure distinction is no longer adequate), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982). 
198. Walko, 554 F.2d at 1167. 
199. /d. at 1171. 
200. /d. 
201. The policies identified were "the desire to forestall forum-shopping and the convic-
tion 'that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to 
differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court.'" /d. at 1170-71 (quot-
ing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467). 
202. /d. at 1172. The court explained that "nonresident defendants could gain advantage 
by removal ... over their diverse adversaries" if federal courts held time-barred 
cases that would have been within the limitation period in state court. /d. Con-
versely, "if ... federal courts hear diversity cases not timely by the lights of state 
tribunals, plaintiffs with large claims against diverse parties may escape the conse-
quences of state law, thus faring better than those to whom the federal courts are 
closed." Id. These disparities, according to the court, would lead to forum-shop-
ping. /d. 
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k. Security for Costs 
In Ilro Productions Ltd. v. Music Fair Enterprises,203 a district court 
devised a test of its own in deciding whether a New York state rule re-
quiring security for costs204 in suits brought by non-resident plaintiffs 
should be applied in a diversity action. Under the federal rule, the court, 
in its discretion, could deny defendant's motion for security for costs. 
Under the New York rule, however, defendant could claim security for 
costs as a matter of right. 205 Holding that the state rule applied, the 
court combined a tripartite policy test,2°6 allegedly taken from Hanna 
and from Professor Ely's commentary,207 with a York-like outcome de-
termination test, to create a wholly original basis for its decision. 208 
Under refined outcome determination, the court's conclusion was 
clearly incorrect. Viewed from the start of the litigation, the difference 
between the two rules did not make the plaintiff's chances of winning on 
the merits in state court any greater than his chances of winning in fed-
eral court. Thus, the difference in the rules did not encourage forum-
shopping and the federal rule should have been applied. The purpose 
behind the state rule was to discourage groundless suits brought by non-
resident plaintiffs against New York citizens.2°9 The state law was sim-
ply a procedural device which furthered this substantive policy by requir-
ing non-resident plaintiffs to post a security bond when bringing suit. 
This rule in no way affects a plaintiff's chances of winning since the rules 
are merely prerequisites for bringing suit. 
There appears to be one set of facts which may make this state law 
outcome-determinative. If an indigent plaintiff is required to post bond 
and cannot do so, suit could not be brought and then the plaintiff's 
chances of winning are nullified. It is only under the federal rule that the 
judge has the discretion to waive the security for costs. 
203. 94 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
204. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 8501-02 (McKinney 1981). 
205. 1/ro, 94 F.R.D. at 79. 
206. The tripartite policy test was as follows: 
(1) elimination of the unfairness of permitting the character or result of a 
litigation materially to differ because the suit is brought in federal 
court; 
(2) nullification of the inducement to forum shop that was embodied in 
the rule of Swift v. Tyson; and 
(3) prevention of the undercutting of state policies as expressed in state 
laws relating to subjects other than the mere management of litigation. 
Id. at 80 (citations omitted). 
The first prong of the test is essentially a variation of the York outcome-deter-
minative test. The second part of the test simply states one of the policy concerns of 
Erie. Prong three of the test was derived from Byrd's balancing test. 
207. ld. (citing Ely, supra note 2, at 712-17). It is inconceivable that the court could 
have relied heavily upon Ely and still have used a series of policy tests. Ely empha-
sized that there is no longer any room for the balancing of policy interests. See Ely, 
supra note 2, at 717 n.130. 
208. Ilro, 94 F.R.D. at 80. 
209. Jd. at 81. 
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2. Issues Not Resolvable with Refined Outcome Determination 
There are several Erie conflicts which are not resolvable within the 
rejuvenated outcome determination framework. Typically, such 
problems concern forum-shopping for state rules which have the poten-
tial to increase the amount awarded without affecting which party is ulti-
mately victorious. 
a. Prejudgment Interest 
A difficult question arises when a federal court is confronted with 
the issue of whether or not to apply state prejudgment interest statutes. 
A Sixth Circuit district court noted the dilemma presented by prejudg-
ment interest: 
Presumably, state law is followed because prejudgment interest 
supposedly affects the "outcome." The reason for this holding 
is not clear. In either state or federal court, a plaintiff is enti-
tled to full compensation for the elements of damage . . . as 
those elements are defined by state law. Damages must be mea-
sured on a particular date. Damages sustained before that date 
should be increased, and damages sustained or expected after 
that date should be decreased, to reflect their value on that 
date. Interest should run ... from the date selected. . . . Thus, 
under proper instructions, the matter seems procedural.210 
In Frenette v. Vickery, 211 a district court in the Second Circuit was 
confronted with the question of whether or not to apply a state law 
which would have entitled the plaintiffs to twelve percent interest on the 
larger of two offers of judgment.212 Without articulating a test, the court 
found the state law to "clearly create a substantive statutory right in per-
sons suing in the Connecticut courts."213 To support its decision, the 
court relied upon two oft-cited claims; that Hanna stated that the out-
come determination analysis was never intended to be used as a "talis-
man," and that the "Erie goals" would be frustrated by failure to apply 
state law. 214 
In Weitz Co. v. Mo-Kan Carpet, Inc. ,215 the Court of Appeals for the 
210. Bass v. Spitz, 522 F. Supp. 1343, 1353 n.23 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (citations omitted). 
211. 522 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Conn. 1981). 
212. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-192a(b) (Supp. 1988). 
213. Frenette, 522 F. Supp. at 1100. 
214. /d. Another similarly difficult RDA issue was presented in Vishipco Line v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982), 
where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied a state breach-day rule 
rather than the federal judgment-day rule to compute damages in an action involv-
ing foreign currency. /d. at 867. Although the outcome-determinative test was 
never mentioned, the court recognized that a plaintiff would be tempted to forum-
shop, based on these two damage rules, depending on whether a currency had ap-
preciated or depreciated. /d. at 866. Again, as in Frenette, the refined outcome 
determination test is inadequate to address this situation. 
215. 723 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1983). 
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Eighth Circuit was faced with the question of whether federal or state 
law governed the awarding of prejudgment and postjudgment interest.216 
The federal postjudgment interest statute permits district courts to award 
interest from the date of judgment in civil actions at a floating rate that 
follows the yield on United States Treasury bills. 217 Separating the dis-
pute into two issues,218 the court held that federal law governed the 
award of postjudgment interest219 while state law governed prejudgment 
interest. 220 The court treated the postjudgment interest issue as an Erie 
problem and resolved it by employing a substance/procedure test,221 
Justice Harlan's "primary private activity" standard,222 an interest anal-
ysis, 223 and an "effects on forum-shopping test. " 224 With regard to pre-
judgment interest, the Weitz court explained that since federal law was 
"silent" on the issue, state law must be applied. 225 In so holding, the 
court misconstrued the problem. 
The Weitz court applied its homemade Erie test to the question of 
postjudgment interest where it was not called for, and neglected to apply 
an Erie test to the prejudgment interest issue where the test was appro-
priate. By the express terms of the RDA, the federal postjudgment inter-
est statute, as an "Act of Congress," must be applied by a federal court 
216. The state law at issue was an Iowa postjudgment interest statute, but the rule was 
not cited by the court. Id. at 1385. 
217. 28 U.S.C. § 196l(a) (Supp. 1983). 
218. Weitz, 723 F.2d at 1385-87. This technique, known as depecage, is used most often 
by common law courts in deciding two or more conflicts issues. Depecage allows· 
courts to apply the rules of different states to determine different issues in the same 
conflicts case. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 362 (4th 
ed. 1987). Use of this practice in the Erie context is logical since similar rules can be 
"substantive" or "procedural" (i.e., outcome-determinative) in different circum-
stances. See, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 756-58 (1st Cir.) (holding 
that the burden of proof respecting contributory negligence, although procedural 
according to state law, was substantive for Erie purposes), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 
(1940). 
219. See, e.g., G.M. Brod & Co. v. U.S. Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526, 1542 (lith Cir. 
1985) (holding that the federal postjudgment interest statute must be applied). 
220. Weitz, 723 F.2d at 1386. 
221. /d. at 1386. 
/d. 
Even if the rate of interest that a judgment will bear is in some sense "sub-
stantive," in that it is a part of the damages recovered by the winning side, 
it is also easily susceptible of characterization as "procedural," since it has 
to do exclusively with events that occur after a dispute gets to court. 
222. /d. "We doubt that anyone plans business conduct on the expectation that if a 
controversy erupts suit will be filed in federal court, rather than a state court, for the 
purposes of obtaining the benefit of a federal statute on post-judgment interest." /d. 
223. /d. at 1386-87. The court explained that there was a clear federal interest in enact-
ing a judgment interest statute-to deter frivolous appeals and to encourage prompt 
payment of judgments. /d. No Byrd balancing was employed because the court 
made no mention of possible state interests. 
224. /d. at 1387. The court explained that applying federal law was "not likely to lead to 
forum-shopping" since there was no way to know what the interest rate would be 
until judgment was entered. /d. 
225. /d. 
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sitting in diversity, notwithstanding contrary state law. 226 
In Casto v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. ,227 an Oklahoma district 
court showed little comprehension of the RDA in deciding whether a 
state prejudgment interest statute228 had to be applied by a diversity 
court. Observing that there was no federal law on point, the court made 
note of a variety oftests, briefly discussed Erie, York, and Hanna, 229 and 
explained that Erie could not be reduced to a substance/procedure di-
chotomy.230 The court then inexplicably relied upon Klaxon Co. v. Sten-
tor Electric Manufacturing Co. 231 for the proposition that federal law was 
not controlling in the area of prejudgment interest.232 Klaxon, however, 
was inapposite as it never addressed a conflict between state and federal 
prejudgment interest statutes. Rather, Klaxon stands for the proposition 
that conflicts of law problems are not exceptions to the Erie rule and that 
a federal court must look to state decisional law in deciding whether to 
apply another state's prejudgment interest rule. 233 
b. Jury Instructions & Evidentiary Rules Concerning Taxation of 
Damage Awards 
In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979 234 
involved two cases arising out of the same set of facts. At issue was 
whether a federal jury should be instructed that personal injury damage 
awards were non-taxable. In contrast to a federal common law rule, 
state law did not require that the jury receive an instruction on the tax 
consequences of personal injury awards.235 In both suits, the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that federal law controlled for rea-
sons of policy, not as a result of any outcome determination analysis.236 
In its policy analysis, the court identified the procedural interests 
226. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1982). 
227. 562 F.2d 622 (lOth Cir. 1977). 
228. The Oklahoma statute provided for prejudgment interest on damages for personal 
injury from the date suit was filed until the date of verdict. The current version of 
the statute is codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 727(A)(2) (West 
Supp. 1989). 
229. Casto, 562 F.2d at 624. The part of Hanna discussed by the court was the section 
devoted to the REA. !d. 
230. !d. 
231. 313 u.s. 487 (1941). 
232. Casto, 562 F.2d at 624-25. 
233. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 497. 
234. 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983) [hereinafter Air Crash I]; 
803 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Air Crash II]. 
235. Air Crash/, 701 F.2d at 1199 (applying Illinois law); Air Crash II, 803 F.2d at 313 
(applying Arizona law). 
236. Air Crash/, 701 F.2d at 1200; Air Crash II, 803 F.2d at 314-15. In Air Crash I, the 
court of appeals discussed outcome determination, but stated that the test was "in-
appropriate here, because we have already determined that increasing awards be-
yond compensation would be an improper outcome under state law." Air Crash I, 
701 F.2d at 1200. The "improper outcome" referred to the court's belief that its job 
was to determine whether an outcome in federal court was contrary to state policy 
interests. See id. at 1199-1200. 
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underlying the relevant Illinois and Arizona rules. 237 These interests 
were aimed at preventing instructions which would complicate trials, im-
properly influence the jury, and invite a flood of cautionary instruc-
tions. 238 The court found these state interests to be procedural because 
"[b]y refusing the nontaxability instruction, [the state] simply [sought] to 
regulate the internal procedure of its courts ... not ... [the] primary 
conduct of its citizens .... " 239 Consequently, the state rule was held 
inapplicable in diversity actions.240 
In Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co. ,241 the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit was presented with an interesting issue concerning the calcula-
tion of wrongful death damages. A federal rule excluding evidence of 
future income conflicted with a state rule which permitted projected in-
come after taxes to be taken into consideration. 242 The state rule usually 
resulted in lower damage awards. Although the court applied an out-
come determination test, it did not appear to be the refined test of 
Hanna. Rather, the court reasoned that no rational plaintiff would 
choose the state forum over the federal because "[t]he difference in 
wrongful death recoveries ... would be staggering," and concluded that 
the state rule must be applied in a diversity action.243 
In applying state law, the court explained that "[u]nder Erie, a state 
rule should be applied in a diversity case if it 'would have so important 
an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to 
enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal 
court.' " 244 Although this statement of the test limits the analysis to the 
choices available to the plaintiff at the outset of the litigation, it fails to 
consider that the only type of forum-shopping prohibited is shopping for 
a favorable result. 
c. Penalties to Encourage Settlement Offers 
Another difficult Erie problem was presented in Jarvis v. Johnson. 245 
There, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was faced with a state 
law which required ten percent interest to be added to certain damage 
awards. 246 The rule applied when no settlement offer was made, or when 
the offer of settlement was twenty-five percent less than the jury verdict. 
237. Air Crash II, 803 F.2d at 315. 
238. /d. 
239. /d. 
240. /d. 
241. 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974). 
242. /d. at 184 n.16. The federal rule was followed by at least three other circuits. See 
Boston & Me. R.R. v. Talbert, 360 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1966); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. 
Curl, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 
1944 ). All three of these cases were heard on grounds of federal question 
jurisdiction. 
243. Turcotte, 494 F.2d at 185. 
244. /d. (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9). 
245. 668 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1982). 
246. 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. Rule 238 (Purdon 1987). The rule, which only applied 
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In holding that the state law must be applied, the court employed an 
analysis which balanced outcome determination and federal policy inter-
ests. 247 The court concluded that failure to apply the state rule in federal 
court would encourage forum-shopping, and that no countervailing fed-
eral interests were offended by application of the state rule. 248 
Although the Jarvis court did not use the refined outcome determi-
nation test, it was on a similar track. Relying upon York outcome deter-
mination, the court concluded that "the existence of [the state rule] has a 
clear and undeniable effect on the monetary outcome of a suit," and was 
thus outcome-determinative.249 This was not a completely accurate use 
of refined outcome determination since it failed to recognize that the 
state law had no impact on who would win on the merits. The court's 
analysis, however, was far closer to Ely's framework than that of other 
courts that have dealt with similar problems. Recognizing that the state 
rule impacted upon the "monetary outcome" of the suit, the court found 
it to be outcome-determinative. 
d. Application of Outcome Determination to RDA Conflicts Involving 
Monetary Differences 
In cases such as Frenette, Weitz, Casto, Air Crash, Turcotte and 
Jarvis, it is difficult to fault the courts for failing to apply a traditional 
Erie analysis. It is understandable that courts choose to look at policy 
concerns since Hanna's refined outcome determination test looks at only 
the rules' effect on who wins or loses and thus does not resolve the 
conflict. 
The difficulty with these issues under the traditional Erie analysis is 
that it is not clear whether the potential for a larger monetary award 
increases the chances of winning on the merits. A state law which pro-
vides a successful plaintiff with interest on an unaccepted settlement offer 
does not appear to increase a plaintiff's chances of winning on the merits; 
it simply increases the amount the plaintiff obtains if victorious. 250 
The issue is whether refined outcome determination precludes only 
result-oriented forum-shopping or limits forum-shopping for a larger 
monetary award as well. Language from the Hanna opinion suggests 
that the Court was concerned with both types of forum-shopping. The 
Court queried whether the state rule would significantly affect "the char-
to personal injury and property damage actions, was designed to encourage settle-
ments and lessen docket congestion. 
247. Jarvis, 668 F.2d at 745. 
248. /d. 
249. /d. 
250. An argument also can be made that any state statute which awards interest on a 
judgment provides a successful plaintiff with an opportunity to "win" twice-<Jnce 
for damages and once for interest on those damages. Since two favorable outcomes 
are better than one, the plaintiff's chances of significantly affecting the "character 
and result of the litigation" can be viewed as greater under the state rule. See 
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9. 
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acter or result of the litigation" as well as the "fortunes" of the liti-
gants. 251 If forum-shopping for a greater award is also an evil Erie 
sought to avert, and if refined outcome determination is capable of man-
aging such issues, then state rules which have the potential to increase 
monetary awards will always be outcome-determinative. 
III. THE RULES ENABLING ACT 
A. Hanna v. Plumer 
The primary issue of Hanna v. Plumer 252 was whether a federal 
court, sitting in diversity, must apply a state in-hand service rule which 
conflicted with FRCP 4(d)(l). To resolve such a conflict, the Court held 
that the REA, and not the RDA, controlled. 253 The REA provides: 
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by 
general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and mo-
tions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts and 
courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions .... 
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right . ... 254 
As interpreted by Professor Ely, the REA requires a two-pronged analy-
sis. First, the Federal Rule must be "procedural," that is, it must regu-
late practice and procedure. Second, it must "not abridge, enlarge or 
modify" any state substantive right.255 
Laying to rest the fear that the Erie doctrine might be used to per-
mit state law to displace large portions of the federal rules, Hanna con-
demned "the incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins constitutes the appropriate test of the validity and therefore 
the applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure."256 The Erie 
RDA analysis is not applicable when a FRCP is involved because by its 
own terms, the RDA provides that state rules of decision apply "except 
where ... Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide. " 257 As an "Act 
of Congress," the REA comes within this exception, and rules enacted 
pursuant to the REA are judged by its provisions and not those of the 
RDA. If this were not the case, important sections of the Federal Rules 
would be overridden by the RDA's outcome-oriented test. Conse-
quently, the REA "must be geared not to the lawsuit's ultimate outcome, 
251. /d. (emphasis added). 
252. 380 u.s. 460 (1968). 
253. /d. at 470. 
254. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (emphasis added). 
255. Ely, supra note 2, at 718-38. 
256. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469-70. "To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must 
cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would 
be to disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or 
Congress' attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act." /d. at 473-74. 
257. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1982). 
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but rather to the character of the state provision that enforcement of the 
Federal Rule in question will supplant."2ss 
Another outcome of Hanna is that unlike conflicts governed by the 
RDA, Federal Rules are given a presumption of validity under the REA. 
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the 
question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively 
unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply 
the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory 
Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie 
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the 
terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions. 259 
Earlier Erie decisions interpreting the RDA, which appeared to place the 
Federal Rules in jeopardy, were distinguished by the Court on the 
grounds that "the holding of each such case was not that Erie com-
manded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but 
rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing 
party urged."260 In Hanna, however, the Court found the scope of 
258. Ely, supra note 2, at 721-22. 
259. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
260. /d. at 470. Apparently, the Court was referring to three earlier cases, all of which 
had been decided on the same day in 1949. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 
U.S. 535 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Ragan 
v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
In Woods, the Court held that a Mississippi door-closing statute, which prohib-
ited corporations not qualified to do business in the state from suing in state courts, 
must be applied in a diversity action. Woods, 337 U.S. at 538. The Court assumed 
that FRCP 17(b) (capacity of a corporation to sue is governed by the law of the state 
in which it is incorporated) did not apply, although several commentators have sug-
gested otherwise. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 755; Ely, supra note 2, 
at 728 n.186. 
In Cohen, the Court held that a federal diversity court was bound to apply a 
New Jersey statute which required a plaintiff to post a bond securing payment of 
defense costs in order to bring a shareholder's derivative action. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 
557. The Court rejected the argument that the state rule conflicted with FRCP 23 
(now FRCP 23.1), the corresponding Federal Rule governing shareholder derivative 
actions. /d. at 556. 
In Ragan, the Court held that FRCP 3 did not govern the manner in which an 
action was commenced in federal court for purposes of tolling a state statute of 
limitations. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533. Therefore, the Kansas service rule controlled 
because it was "an integral part" of the state statute of limitations and Erie required 
that the Court not give the cause of action a "longer life in the federal court than it 
would have had in the state court." /d. at 533-34. 
The Hanna majority took great care to distinguish Ragan as a case in which 
the Federal Rule had been construed narrowly in order to avoid a clash with the 
state law. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 n.12. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Hanna, 
however, placed Ragan in jeopardy, because he contended that the case was decided 
incorrectly. /d. at 477. The confusion prevalent among the lower federal courts 
should have been laid to rest by one of the most recent Erie decisions, Walker v. 
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), a case whose facts were indistinguishable 
from those of Ragan. In Walker, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Ragan. 
See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51. 
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FRCP 4 sufficiently broad to conflict directly with the Massachusetts 
rule. 
Before the REA test is engaged, a "direct collision" between a Fed-
eral Rule and state law must exist. 261 In determining whether a "direct 
collision" exists, the Federal Rule should be given its "plain meaning" 
and not read narrowly simply to avoid a conflict with state law.262 
In Hanna, the "clash" between FRCP 4(d)(l) and the state rule was 
deemed "unavoidable" so that application of the REA analysis was nec-
essary.263 In holding the Federal Rule valid and controlling, Hanna ad-
ded little to existing REA interpretation. The first half of the REA 
standard-the requirement that the Federal Rule be procedural-had al-
ready been construed by the Court in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 264 The 
second prong of the statute, which requires that the Federal Rule not 
abridge state substantive rights, had never been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court and remained unconstrued after Hanna. 
B. The REA Test 
1. The First Prong of the REA 
The Sibbach Court, in affirming the validity of Federal Rules 35 and 
37, stated that procedural rules were those used "for enforcing rights and 
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy 
and redress for disregard or infraction of them."265 Hanna, recognizing 
that a Federal Rule could have both substantive and procedural charac-
teristics, held that the first prong of the REA is met if the Federal Rule is 
"rationally capable of classification" as procedural.266 Justice Harlan, in 
concurrance, rephrased the first prong as an "arguably procedural" stan-
dard.267 Because the Federal Rules are all "arguably procedural," the 
first prong of the Hanna test does not normally present an obstacle to the 
application of a Federal Rule. 
2. The Second Prong of the REA 
The Hanna Court did not discuss the "substantive" half of the REA 
test although such a discussion was warranted. In determining whether 
application of a FRCP will "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right," the initial inquiry is to define the term "substantive." The Hanna 
261. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-52 (1980). 
262. !d. at 750 n.9. 
263. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965). 
264. 312 u.s. 1, 10 (1940). 
265. !d. at 14. 
266. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. Professor Ely defines a procedural rule as "one designed to 
make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes." Ely, supra note 2, at 724. This definition is consistent with the underly-
ing policy of the REA itself, which is to regulate procedure "in the interest of 
speedy, fair and exact determination of the truth." Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. 
267. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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majority, whether intentionally or not, advanced a definition of a sub-
stantive right as a rule not "rationally capable of classification" as proce-
duraJ.268 As Justice Harlan pointed out, this definition merely repeats 
the first prong of the REA analysis, and renders the second prong power-
less by giving the Federal Rules an almost invincible quality.269 Until 
Hanna, the Court had avoided this result by minimizing the substantive 
effects of state law,270 or by narrowly construing the Federal Rules. 271 
Another possible way to define "substantive" is found in Justice 
Harlan's concurrence, where he defined such a rule as one having a "sub-
stantial impact on private primary activity"272 or which "substantially 
affect[s] those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our 
constitutional system leaves to state regulation. " 273 A substantive law 
affects primary conduct when it influences one's expectations of how 
their affairs are to be conducted. In addition, certain nonconduct ori-
ented laws fostering and protecting legal repose also could be classified as 
substantive laws. 274 Sovereign immunity laws and statutes of limitations 
are examples of such laws. 275 
Proper application of the second prong of the REA test requires an 
examination of the purposes and effects of the state rule. If the state rule 
is procedural, the Federal Rule must be applied. If a state law was 
passed to regulate primary private activity or to protect and foster re-
pose, it is substantive and a Federal Rule which conflicts with it would 
268. Jd. 
269. Justice Harlan's concurrence expressed his apprehension that the majority's "argua-
bly procedural, ergo constitutional" test was far too protective of the Federal Rules. 
!d. 
270. See, e.g., Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 1. Although the Sibbach majority rejected the peti-
tioner's argument that application of FRCP 35 would violate her substantive state 
right to privacy, Justice Frankfurter's dissent indicated that the petitioner may have 
had a valid point: "That disobedience of an order under Rule 35 cannot be visited 
with punishment as for contempt does not mitigate its intrusion into an historic 
immunity of the privacy of the person." I d. at 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Pro-
fessor Ely claims that if a state law existed which granted "a right grounded in 
considerations of bodily privacy, ... [the REA's] second sentence would preclude 
application of Rule 35." Ely, supra note 2, at 733-34. 
271. See, e.g., Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Ware-
house Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
272. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 477 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
273. Jd. at 475; cf HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 747 n.1 (substantive rules are 
"those rules which characteristically and reasonably affect people's conduct at the 
stage of primary private activity"). 
274. Ely, supra note 2, at 726. 
275. Sovereign immunity is intended to immunize the government from liability in order 
for it to operate more efficiently. Jd. The procedural goals relate to the management 
and control of the docket, and are of minor importance compared to their substan-
tive aspects. Statutes of limitations, on the other hand, "are passed for the substan-
tive purpose of relieving people's minds after passage of the designated period." I d. 
Thus, if Congress enacted a statute of limitations for diversity cases, a Federal Rule 
prescribing such a limitation would not satisfy the second prong of the REA. I d. at 
726-27. 
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fail to satisfy the requirements of the second half of the REA. Hanna 
recognized that a state law could have both procedural and substantive 
aims. But such laws would not satisfy the second prong either, for there 
is no room in the REA for consideration of a state law's procedural 
aspects. 
Recently, in Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, 276 the Supreme 
Court advanced what could be a possible exception to the second prong 
of the REA. The Court explained that even if a Federal Rule were to 
"incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights," application of that Rule 
would "not violate [the second prong] if reasonably necessary to main-
tain the integrity of [the Federal Rules]."277 
C Application of the REA in the Federal Courts 
1. FRCP 2 
In Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 278 the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit identified a conflict between an Illinois state rule and 
FRCP 2. The state rule, grounded in the separation of law and equity, 
required plaintiffs to elect their remedies when filing suit,279 but FRCP 2 
had abandoned the law and equity distinction in federal courts. Roberts, 
who sought return of a patent, had initially chosen to try his case before 
a jury in a court of law, and was thereby barred under state law from also 
seeking a remedy from a state court of equity.280 Holding that a federal 
court was not bound by the state "election of remedies" doctrine, the 
court of appeals cited to Hanna and reasoned that application of state 
law impermissibly violated FRCP 2.281 For reasons which were unclear, 
the court explained that it viewed the problem as one controlled by the 
RDA.282 
Roberts appears to present a straightforward REA conflict between 
a state rule and a Federal Rule. The state election of remedies doctrine, 
which requires that a plaintiff choose relief at law or equity, provides 
procedural rights by regulating the manner and means for recovery 
under a substantive cause of action. No substantive rights of the parties 
were abridged when the Federal Rules were more generous than the state 
rules by providing both legal and equitable relief. Consequently, since 
the state law was procedural, application of FRCP 2 did not violate the 
terms of the REA. 
276. 480 U.S. I (1987). 
277. Id. at 970. 
278. 573 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1978). 
279. /d. at 985. 
280. /d. at 980. In the second suit, plaintiff sought rescission of a contract, a remedy 
only available in equity. 
281. ld. at 985. 
282. /d. at 985 n.9. 
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2. FRCP 3 
REA disputes involving FRCP 3, which states that an action is 
commenced upon the filing of a complaint, have been addressed in al-
most every circuit. This issue, which was decided by Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer & Warehouse Co.,283 but unsettled by Hanna, was finally laid to 
rest by the Supreme Court's decision in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 284 
Walker held that there was no conflict between FRCP 3 and state com-
mencement rules and thus no need for an Erie analysis. 
One case from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that 
viewed Ragan as overruled by Hanna was Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey 
Co. 285 Sylvestri held that FRCP 3 governs the time of commencement of 
a diversity suit for purposes of a state limitations period.286 In reaching 
this result, the court incorrectly used the refined outcome determination 
test, 287 rather than the REA standard. 
In two later Second Circuit cases, Bratel v. Kutsher's Country 
Club 288 and Zarcone v. Condie, 289 the same district court reaffirmed 
Sylvestri on the basis of stare decisis. In fact, in Zarcone, the court stated 
that it was "convinced that the rule enunciated in Ragan must be fol-
lowed by the district courts ... until the Supreme Court directs other-
wise."290 The court explained, however, that for purposes of the present 
case, it was bound by the position taken by the court of appeals in 
Sylvestri. 291 
Decisions emanating from the Eighth Circuit exemplify the evolu-
tion of federal court treatment of the conflict between FRCP 3 and state 
statute of limitations, and until Walker, many courts incorrectly held 
that FRCP 3 governed the commencement of the limitations period. In 
Prashar v. Volkswagen, 292 for example, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit held that FRCP 3 was controlling on the issue of when a 
limitations period began to run, since the state commencement statute 
283. 337 u.s. 530 (1949). 
284. 446 u.s. 740 (1980). 
285. 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968). 
286. /d. at 606. But cf Worldwide Carriers Ltd. v. Aris S.S. Co., 312 F. Supp. 172 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (concluding that Sylvestri and Hanna were not controlling, and 
looking to state law, based on FRCP 64, to determine the commencement date of a 
special proceeding required under a state provisional remedies statute). 
287. It is significant that the court recognized that Hanna did "represent a modification, 
or at least a refinement of the 'outcome determination' test." Sylvestri, 398 F.2d at 
605. In fact, this court may have been the first to acknowledge the new test. It is 
indeed paradoxical that in subsequent cases involving an RDA conflict, courts of 
the Second Circuit have failed to apply the refined test. See, e.g., Frenette v. Vick-
ery, 522 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Conn. 1981); Ilro Prod. Ltd. v. Music Fair Enter., 94 
F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
288. 61 F.R.D. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
289. 62 F.R.D. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
290. /d. at 570. 
291. /d. 
292. 480 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1973). 
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was not an "integral part" of the state statute of limitations. 293 Rather 
than taking the unsound position that Hanna overruled Ragan,294 the 
court distinguished Ragan as a case where "Rule 3 was not controlling 
since the ... commencement of action statute was so intimately bound 
up with the rights and obligations created by the state statute of limita-
tions."295 The court identified commencement rules as "housekeeping 
rules ... dealing only with a mode of enforcing state-created rights," 
which were consequently incapable of encouraging forum-shopping or 
encroaching upon state interests. 296 
Prashar was the rule of the Eighth Circuit297 until the court of ap-
peals corrected itself in the first opportunity presented after the Supreme 
Court's decision in Walker. In Fischer v. Iowa Mold Tooling Co. ,298 the 
Eighth Circuit implicitly overruled Prashar and held that state law deter-
mined when an action was commenced for purposes of the statute of 
limitations. 299 The court relied exclusively on Walker, which "laid to 
rest the notion that Rule 3 can ever be used to toll a state statute of 
limitations. "300 
293. /d. at 951. 
294. Most courts which have favored FRCP 3 over the state commencement rule have 
taken the position that Ragan was overruled by Hanna. See, e.g., Walker, 446 U.S. 
at 744 n.6. 
295. Prasher, 480 F.2d at 951. 
296. /d. at 952. In Chladek v. Stems Transportation Co., 427 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 
1977), a district court employed another type of interest analysis to find that a Penn-
sylvania commencement rule was not an integral part of the state statute of limita-
tions. /d. at 274-75. The court gave two reasons why FRCP 3 governed: first, 
"Hanna mandate[d] application of [FRCP] 3"; and second, the federal interest in 
applying the Federal Rule is "an affirmative, countervailing consideration which 
sufficiently offsets the possibility that application of the state rule could substantially 
affect the outcome of the litigation." /d. at 275 n.6. This latter analysis demon-
strates a plausible, although inapplicable, interpretation of Byrd balancing-the 
state law's effect on the outcome must be weighed against any countervailing federal 
interests. 
297. See Walden v. Tulsair Beechcraft, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 34 (W.D. Ark. 1982). This was 
an interesting decision because it was decided after Walker, but before the Eighth 
Circuit had overruled Prashar. The district abided by Prasher, and explained that 
"while we recognize that Walker is, of course, mandatory precedent, it is not on 
point. Rather, Prashar is the mandatory precedent practically identical to this 
cause." /d. at 41; see also Schinker v. Rudd Mfg. Co., 386 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Iowa 
1974) (adhering to the Prasher rule). 
298. 690 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1982). 
299. /d. at 156. 
300. Id. at 157. The Fifth Circuit, in Calhoun v. Ford, 625 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1980), also 
correctly relied on Walker in one of the circuit's first Erie-type cases decided subse-
quent to publication of Professor Ely's article. The court was confronted with a 
case in which, under Louisiana law, the state statute of limitations would have 
barred the suit, while under FRCP 3, the suit would have been timely. Id. at 577. 
The court addressed the threshold issue of whether a conflict existed between state 
and federal law, and held that "there [was) no direct conflict because Rule 3 simply 
(did] not address itself to the question of when the prescriptive period (was] tolled." 
/d. The court noted that Walker "made it clear that federal courts should resort to 
the Hanna analysis only when there is a direct conflict between a federal rule and 
state law." /d. For the most part, other courts have ignored this issue, and the 
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has also had numerous 
opportunities to resolve conflicts involving FRCP 3. In contrast to the 
Second and Eighth Circuits, which until Walker viewed the Federal Rule 
as controlling over state law, the Tenth Circuit has consistently held that 
state tolling rules do not conflict with FRCP 3. Although the court of 
appeals acknowledged that Hanna may have overruled Ragan, it felt 
"compelled to uphold and follow the Ragan decision . . . since Ragan 
originated in this Circuit."301 The Walker decision's post-Hanna ap-
proval of Ragan put to rest any concerns the court may have had. 
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 302 for example, the court, presented 
with an alleged conflict between a state tolling provision303 and FRCP 3, 
held that Ragan mandated application of the state rule. 304 Although the 
Walker court questioned whether Hanna might conflict with Ragan, it 
noted that in Hanna: 
[T]he outcome determinative test was rejected and the [FRCP] 
were ruled applicable. However, the court in a footnote distin-
guished Ragan even though Ragan had applied the outcome 
determinative test which the court was engaged in rejecting at 
least to the extent that pure procedural questions were being 
decided. 305 
Thus, the Tenth Circuit's adherence to Ragan seemed based more on 
loyalty to a local decision than on reasoning. 306 
3. FRCP 4(h) 
In Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,307 the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit addressed what it perceived to be a conflict between 
Fifth Circuit's head-on confrontation with the issue may be attributed, in part, to 
both Ely's article and Walker. 
301. Rose v. K.K. Masutoku Toy Factory Co., 597 F.2d 215, 218 (lOth Cir. 1979). 
302. 592 F.2d 1133 (lOth Cir. 1979), a.ff'd, 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
303. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 97 (West 1978). This rule requires that a plaintiff 
timely file a complaint, as well as issue and serve a defendant with a summons, 
within the applicable limitations period. 
304. Walker, 592 F.2d at 1136. 
305. /d. at 1135-36. Although the district court reached the same result in Walker, it 
viewed the fact that Hanna distinguished Ragan as meaning that Ragan was still 
good law: "The United States Supreme Court has not been shy to overrule cases 
expressly, and the fact the Supreme Court not only did not overrule Ragan, but in 
fact distinguished it, in Hanna, persuades this Court that Ragan still controls." 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 452 F. Supp. 243, 245 (W.D. Okla. 1978). 
306. Walker, 592 F.2d at 1136. The court noted that "the Supreme Court would per-
form a great service if it were to clear away the dilemma which exists as a result of 
the conflict between Ragan and Hanna." /d. But see Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson 
Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1123 (lOth Cir.) (court of appeals properly distinguished 
FRCP 3 from an Oklahoma tolling provision and found no conflict to exist), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 856 (1979). 
307. 530 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1976). The Third Circuit's Erie position is articulated in 
Witherow and Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979). See supra notes 83-
89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Edelson. 
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state and federal service-of-process rules. The state rule provided that if 
suit was commenced by writ of summons, the writ had to be served upon 
the defendant within the applicable limitations period. 308 In contrast, 
FRCP 4(h) granted discretion to the judge to amend or perfect service of 
process, even after expiration of the limitations period, if it would not 
prejudice the rights of the party to be served. 309 When the plaintiff failed 
to reissue the writ before expiration of the two-year statute of limitations, 
he sought to amend his defective service under the Federal Rules. 310 Be-
cause the court found that the defendant had actual notice and would not 
be prejudiced by permitting the defective service to be amended, 311 it 
granted plaintiff's motion to amend. 312 The Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit reversed, holding that Erie required application of the state 
rule. 313 
In finding that the action was time-barred,314 the court of appeals 
rejected what it termed the "mechanical interpretation" of Erie and its 
progeny. 315 Citing the "talisman" language of Hanna, the court began 
with a policy analysis comprised of three factors: forum-shopping, equal 
protection, and federalism. 316 Before finishing this analysis, however, the 
court shifted ground and found the state statute of limitations to be out-
come-determinative because of the policy of repose embodied in the state 
law.317 
Initially, the Witherow court framed the Erie issue in terms of a con-
flict between state and federal service-of-process rules. Surprisingly, 
however, it disregarded this problem and decided the case on statute of 
limitations grounds. Since the action was barred by the state statute of 
limitations, it is odd that FRCP 4(h) was even considered. Nevertheless, 
the court held that FRCP 4(h) applied only to formal errors and thus did 
not apply to a defective service.318 
If the Witherow court had allowed an amendment to the original 
308. 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. Rule 1007 (Purdon 1987). Normally, filing the writ 
tolled the limitations period for two years from the date of the issuance of the writ. 
309. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h). 
310. Witherow, 530 F.2d at 162. The defendant, Firestone, removed the case to federal 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1448 (1982). Why the defendant removed the case 
under these circumstances is unclear since the suit was time-barred by state law. 
Once removed though, plaintiff was permitted to attempt to cure the defective ser-
vice by application of FRCP 4(h). 
311. Witherow, 530 F.2d at 166. 
312. Id. at 162. 
313. Id. at 169. The court of appeals concluded that the action would have been time-
barred had it remained in state court. /d. at 163. 
314. Id. at 165-66. 
315. Id. at 163. 
316. ld. at 164. 
317. Id. at 166. The court stated that "[w]hile we avoid mechanical application of the 
'outcome-determinative' test, or any other single test, we observe that nothing could 
be more 'substantial' than to allow an action to proceed in federal court which 
would be time-barred in state court." /d. 
318. Id. at 166-67. 
1989] Myth of Erie 449 
service-of-process, it would have effectively circumvented the state stat-
ute of limitations. In situations such as Witherow, where state law would 
not permit a post-limitations period amendment to defective service, an 
amendment in federal court under FRCP 4(h) might well violate a de-
fendant's substantive right to repose. Because state statutes of limita-
tions are substantive, using a Federal Rule to extend the limitations 
period beyond that permitted under state law would· modify a state sub-
stantive right. Thus, although the Witherow court did not confront the 
issue, this Erie conflict was one in which application of the Federal Rule 
might well have violated the terms of the REA Act. 
4. FRCP 8(a)(3) 
Szantay's319 influence in the Fourth Circuit was evidenced in Rich-
ards & Associates, Inc. v. Boney.320 At issue was a state pleading rule 
which forbade the stating of a precise monetary amount in malpractice 
suits seeking over $10,000 in damages. 321 This rule differed from FRCP 
8(a)(3), which permits a plaintiff to request the precise amount "to which 
he deems himself entitled."322 The Boney court held that although the 
state rule was "procedural," it was " 'intimately bound up' with a sub-
stantive state policy" and therefore must be applied in a diversity ac-
tion. 323 Although the court noted that there was no conflict between the 
state and federal rules, 324 it nevertheless relied upon Szantay and looked 
to the policy concerns underlying the state rule. 325 Finding these con-
cerns substantive, the court held that state law must be applied even 
though the rule itself was procedural. 326 
If in fact the court was correct in concluding that no conflict existed, 
Erie would have been inapplicable. The conflict between the state law 
and FRCP 8, however, seems undeniable here. In Boney, the plaintiff 
filed a complaint in federal court to recover $600,000 in a malpractice 
action. Specifying the damages was entirely consistent with FRCP 8, 
which permits plaintiffs to do so at their option. State law, on the other 
hand, did not permit precise reference to the amount of damages sought 
when that amount exceeded $10,000. Therefore, when the plaintiff speci-
fied damages to be $600,000, federal and state law unavoidably clashed. 
319. See supra notes 107-113 and accompanying text for discussion of Szantay. 
320. 604 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D.N.C. 1985). 
321. N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-1, Rule 8(a)(2) (1983). For example, the statute does not 
permit a plaintiff to request $600,000 in damages (as the plaintiff in Boney at-
tempted); the request could only be stated as "a sum in excess of $10,000." Boney, 
604 F. Supp. at 1217. 
322. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3). 
323. Boney, 604 F. Supp. at 1218 (quoting DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem. 
Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 290 (1980)). 
324. /d. 
325. /d. The substantive policy behind the state rule was to avoid adverse press attention 
which so often accompanies malpractice suits seeking large damage awards. Jones 
v. Boyce, 60 N.C. App. 585, 587, 299 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1983). 
326. Boney, 604 F. Supp. at 1218. 
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Since FRCP 8 does not require a specification of damages, an REA 
conflict can only exist when a plaintiff fails to plead damages in accord-
ance with state law. As a rule which governs the substance of the plead-
ings, FRCP 8 satisfies the first half of the REA test because it is at least 
arguably procedural, but it does not necessarily satisfy the second half of 
the test. Where, as in Boney, the state rule was designed to protect the 
reputations of the accused in malpractice actions, then application of 
FRCP 8 would abridge and modify state-created substantive rights of 
privacy for state health care providers, who are often faced with adverse 
publicity resulting from lawsuits. In such circumstances, state law must 
be applied in lieu of FRCP 8 to avoid violating the REA's pronounce-
ment that Federal Rules not infringe upon state substantive rights. 
5. FRCP 15(c) 
The most widely litigated REA issue, and one that is particularly 
troublesome for federal courts, concerns FRCP 15(c). Federal Rule 
15(c) specifies the conditions under which an amendment to a pleading 
relates back to the date of the original pleading. Courts are frequently 
presented with conflicts between FRCP 15(c) and state rules which pro-
vide alternative relation-back methods. 
The First Circuit decision in Marshall v. Mulrenin, 327 is unique in 
that it expressly rejected Professor Ely's REA formulation. Declaring 
that it did "not accept the 'singularly hard-hearted' view [of Ely] ... that 
Hanna commands that the Federal Rules be woodenly applied ... " 328 the 
court announced what it considered to be the proper test for resolving a 
conflict between a state rule and a FRCP, one that followed the obsolete 
substance/procedure dichotomy. 329 
Many district courts, most notably those of the Second Circuit, have 
ignored the REA in resolving FRCP 15(c) disputes. For example, m 
327. 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974). 
328. /d. at 44. 
329. /d. The court described the test as follows: "We consider Hanna's definitive hold-
ing to be contained in its disclaimer of an intent to effect substantive conse-
quences .... It merely means that a rule is not to be applied to the extent, if any, 
that it would defeat rights arising from state substantive law as distinguished from 
state procedure." /d. 
With this type of guidance from Marshall, perhaps it is not surprising that the 
district courts of the First Circuit have been somewhat confused. For example, in 
Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427 (D. Mass. 1981), the court relied upon Mar-
shall to support its adherence to the state relation-back rule. In holding that FRCP 
IS( c) need not be applied, the court distinguished Hanna and argued that it had not 
changed the rule of Erie: "It has been argued [by Ely] that, in view of the stated 
holding of Hanna, the rule of Erie is irrelevant to the issue before a court confronted 
with a clash between a federal rule of civil procedure and state law." /d. at 431. 
The court then rejected this view, and opted for the "twin aims of Erie" rather than 
an REA analysis. Reasoning that the "Massachusetts rule would be relevant both 
to choice of forum and equitable administration of the laws," the court concluded 
that the state relation-back rule had to be applied in a diversity action. /d. 
'· 
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Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 330 the court applied the Federal Rule 
but based its decision on a mixture of policy and generalities. 331 In Flo-
rence v. Krasucki, 332 in contrast, the court grounded its decision on the 
principle of stare decisis333 and the finding that state interests were not 
impaired by application of the Federal Rule. 334 Finally, in Applied Data 
Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,335 the court applied FRCP 15(c) 
based upon the belief that Hanna had overruled Ragan. Adhering to 
Sylvestri, 336 the court reasoned that since FRCP 3 governed the question 
of when an action was commenced for statute of limitations purposes, 
similar considerations mandated that FRCP 15(c) govern the question of 
whether an amendment to a complaint would relate back. 337 
Two Fourth Circuit cases, Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 338 and Good-
man v. Poland, 339 recognized the REA's applicability, yet failed to follow 
330. 440 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). 
331. /d. at 1093. The court stated four reasons for following FRCP 15(c): (1) "In gen-
eral, if a question is covered by a provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the federal rule, rather than state law will control"; (2) FRCP l5(c) fulfills "the 
primary purpose behind a state statute of limitations"; (3) Most other courts which 
had addressed the issue had also applied the Federal Rule; and (4) FRCP l5(c) was 
similar to the New York rule and "might very well lead to the same result." /d. at 
1093 n.2. 
If, in fact, the state and Federal Rules were the same or led to the same result, 
then no plain conflict as contemplated by Walker existed, and there was no need for 
an REA analysis. But the court never examined whether the two rules did in fact 
lead to different outcomes. 
332. 533 F. Supp. 1047 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
333. The case relied upon was Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979). In Ingram, the Second Circuit again reaffirmed Sylves-
tri and emphasized that to overrule the decision would require a rehearing en bane. 
/d. at 568. The court stated that they had "no problem in finding that Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 15( c) applies in federal courts not withstanding a possibly more restrictive 
state practice." Id. at 570 n.5. 
334. Florence, 533 F. Supp. at 1052. 
335. 58 F.R.D. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). 
336. 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968); see also supra note 285-287 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of Sylvestri. 
337. Applied Data, 58 F.R.D. at 152. The Applied Data court made two erroneous as-
sumptions. With hindsight, the court's major premise, that Hanna overruled 
Ragan, is no longer sound in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Walker. Fur-
thermore, the court was mistaken in its conclusion that the same policy considera-
tions form the foundation of both FRCP 3 and FRCP 15(c). State statutes of 
limitations are passed for the substantive purpose of offering "the right to breathe 
easy" to potential defendants, and statutes governing the time when an action is 
commenced are integral parts of limitations periods. Consequently, if FRCP 3 was 
interpreted as a commencement rule for state statutes of limitations, the second 
prong of the REA would be violated. Federal Rule 3 does not govern the com-
mencement of an action for statute of limitations purposes because substantive poli-
cies of repose would be implicated. Twice, in fact, the Supreme Court has refused to 
extend the reach of FRCP 3. See Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533; Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-
51. Federal Rule 15( c), on the other hand, governs the amendment of a filed com-
plaint. A potential defendant already has received notice when FRCP 15(c) is ap-
plied; therefore, no substantive concerns of repose are presented. 
338. 615 F.2d 606 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 911 (1980). 
339. 395 F. Supp. 660 (D. Md. 1975). 
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through with the requisite analysis. 340 Confronted with circumstances in 
which the Federal Rule would permit the amendments sought but state 
law would not, each court summarily concluded that FRCP 15(c) must 
be applied simply because that Rule violated neither the REA nor the 
Constitution. 341 
In Johansen v. E.l Du Pont De Nemours & Co. 342 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit, in applying Rule 15(c) over an equivalent 
Texas relation-back statute,343 employed an REA analysis similar to that 
championed by Professor Ely. The court explained that "Rule 15(c) is a 
truly procedural rule because it governs the in-court dispute resolution 
processes rather than the dispute that brought the parties into court,"344 
and therefore, was within the terms of the REA. 345 
Although its analysis was rather brief, the court covered all the nec-
essary bases. While other courts have often used the term "procedural" 
in a loose sense, Johansen advanced a novel definition which was well 
within the constraints of Hanna, and one quite similar to Professor Ely's. 
Thus, even though Ely was not expressly cited, his influence can be seen. 
Surprisingly though, only two courts in the Fifth Circuit have ever cited 
to Ely, and these citations were of a general nature.346 
Several REA cases in the Tenth Circuit have been decided solely on 
the grounds that Hanna demands a per se application of the Federal 
Rules in the face of any contrary state rule. In American Bankers Insur-
340. Davis, 615 F.2d at 611; Goodman, 395 F. Supp. at 683. 
341. Davis, 615 F.2d at 612; Goodman, 395 F. Supp. at 683. Interestingly, Davis con-
tained a dissent grounded in the belief that the outcome determination test should 
have been applied, and that application of this test would have led the court to apply 
state law. Davis, 615 F.2d at 617. The dissent saw Davis as representative of a 
"classic" Erie issue. 
342. 810 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1987). 
343. /d. at 1380. The district court had held that plaintiff's amendment to the complaint 
was time-barred under Texas law. Id. at 1379. The Texas law provided that an 
amendment could only relate back to the original complaint if it contained allega-
tions "based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence." TEX. REv. 
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5539b (repealed 1985). 
344. Johansen, 810 F.2d at 1380. Ely defines a "procedural rule" as "one designed to 
make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes." Ely, supra note 2, at 724. 
345. /d. 
346. See Glazer v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 616 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1980); Georgia 
Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d 1178, 1192 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 907 (1979). The reasoning of the Johansen court can be contrasted with an 
earlier Fifth Circuit case, Welch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 466 F.2d 1344 
(5th Cir. 1972). In Welch, a case decided two years prior to publication of Ely's The 
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, the court used the rather rudimentary "test" typical of 
most other circuits. Faced with a conflict between FRCP 15(c) and a similar state 
rule, the court held that the Federal Rule applied because of Hanna's "strong pre-
sumption" in favor of the Federal Rules, and because of the policy concerns sup-
porting their application. /d. at 1345-46. The court stated that "the Supreme Court 
has established a strong presumption that the federal rules govern, rather than state 
Jaw, in cases involving arguably procedural matters." /d. at 1345. 
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ance Co. v. Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. ,347 for example, the court was 
presented with a potential conflict between FRCP 15(c) and a state 
rule. 348 Rather than deciding whether a conflict existed, the court read 
Hanna as rendering any analysis unnecessary since "even if Colorado law 
did dictate a contrary result, this is a question of federal procedure that is 
not controlled by Colorado law."349 
When state law and FRCP 15(c) conflict, the REA would not be 
infringed by application of the Federal Rule. Any rule which governs 
the substance of a pleading has procedural overtones, but the more diffi-
cult hurdle faced is the application of the substantive half of the REA. A 
party seeking to prevent an amendment might argue that FRCP 15(c) 
violates a substantive right of repose by permitting new elements to be 
included in the pleadings. Such a contention would fail, however, since 
an amendment under Rule 15(c) only relates back to the original filing if 
the party against whom an amendment is sought has already received 
notice within the applicable limitations period. Thus, by the terms of 
FRCP 15, feelings of repose cannot be impinged upon when a party "has 
received such notice ... that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his 
defense on the merits."35° Consequently, no state substantive right is 
"abridged, enlarged or modified" by application of Rule 15(c). 
An interesting twist to the typical Rule 15( c) conflict has been 
presented on several occasions in the Ninth Circuit, where a potential 
conflict has been. thought to exist between the Federal Rule and a Cali-
fornia "John Doe" statute. California law gives plaintiffs who institute 
an action against an unknown defendant three years from the commence-
ment of the action to discover the identity of the defendant and amend 
the complaint accordingly.351 This rule, in essence, serves to toll the ap-
plicable limitations period for up to three years. Federal Rule 15( c) re-
quires that notice be given within the state limitations period. 
Consequently, since the state statute of limitations is incorporated within 
FRCP 15(c) and not altered by it, no REA conflict exists between the 
Federal Rule and state rules affecting the length of the limitations period. 
347. 93 F.R.D. 135 (D. Colo. 1982). 
348. !d. at 137. The conflict was only a "potential" one because the court deemed it 
unnecessary to examine Colorado state law. Consequently, no specific state law was 
cited to in the decision. 
349. !d. (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)). Per se application of the Federal Rules is 
typical of other Tenth Circuit cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 
784, 797 (lOth Cir. 1980) (Wyoming practice is irrelevant because Hanna requires 
that "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure control this diversity action even where 
there exists a conflict."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981); Saraniero v. Safeway, 
Inc., 540 F. Supp. 749, 751 (D. Kan. 1982) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
... apply to all diversity cases even if they directly conflict with competing state 
cases."). See also Thomas v. Mitchell-Bradford Chern. Co., 582 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying FRCP 15(c) without any REA analysis). 
350. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). 
351. CAL CJv. PROC. ConE§ 474, 583.210 (1979 & Supp. 1987). 
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In Rumberg v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 352 a district court in the Ninth 
Circuit held that the state "John Doe" rule did not conflict with FRCP 
15(c) because "[t]he California statute of limitations scheme ... does not 
deal with the 'relation back' doctrine at all but rather extends or tolls the 
limitations period."353 The court reasoned that FRCP 15(c) governed 
amendments sought after the limitations period had expired, but in no 
way affected the actual length of that period,354 and consequently, no 
conflict between a federal rule and state rule existed. The court did not, 
however, consider whether under the RDA the John Doe rule had to be 
applied by a federal diversity court. 
Rumberg has been cited favorably by other courts and commenta-
tors355 and was ultimately adopted as the law of the Ninth Circuit in 
Lindley v. General Electric Co. 356 In addition, in Brennan v. Lermer 
Corp., 357 another district court took the Rumberg analysis one step fur-
ther and applied an Erie outcome determination analysis to the state 
John Doe rule. After concluding that no conflict existed between the 
state rule and FRCP 15(c),358 the court looked to the "twin aims of 
Erie," rejected the refined outcome determination test,359 and reasoned 
that failure to apply the state John Doe rule would lead to forum-shop-
ping360 and inequitable administration of the laws. 361Accordingly, the 
court concluded, state law should be applied. 362 
352. 424 F. Supp. 294 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
353. /d. at 300-01. 
354. /d. 
355. 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 4509, at 158-59 (1982). 
356. 780 F.2d 797 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986). In Lindley, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the claim that Hanna controlled because "the asserted conflict be-
tween Rule lS(c) and state Doe practice [was] 'bogus.'" /d. at 801. The court 
viewed the state John Doe rule as a tolling provision, and as such, an integral part of 
the state limitations period. /d. 
357. 626 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
358. /d. at 934-35. Up to this point, the court's Erie analysis was excellent. Relying 
upon Walker, the court recognized that there was no "direct conflict" between the 
two rules because FRCP IS( c) was "not concerned either with determining or alter-
ing the length of the limitations period. Rather, Rule IS( c) [spoke] to the question 
whether, and under what circumstances, a party may amend his or her complaint 
after the limitations period has already run." /d. at 934-35 (emphasis in original). 
359. "Hanna eschewed the 'outcome-determinative' test, pointing out that any proce-
dural differences [were] likely to result in a different outcome." /d. at 935 n.l2 
(emphasis in original). 
360. "A device that effectively quadruples the tort statute of limitations can hardly be 
deemed a procedural triviality unlikely to lead to forum shopping." /d. at 936 
(quoting Hogan, California's Unique Doe Defendant Practice: A Fiction Stranger 
Than Truth, 30 STAN. L. REV. 51, 110 (1977)). 
361. "[T]he disparity between the limitations period available in the two forums creates 
precisely the kind of inequity with which the Erie court was concerned." Brennan, 
626 F. Supp. at 936. 
362. /d. at 934-35. There have been several other Ninth Circuit cases involving FRCP 
lS(c). In Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1982), the court of 
appeals, faced with a conflict between FRCP lS(c) and an analogous state rule, held 
without analysis that "Hanna commands application of Rule IS( c) in the face of a 
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The Brennan court's finding that the John Doe rule was "part and 
parcel of the [state] statute of limitations"363 should have been sufficient 
to decide the issue. California's John Doe rule has the effect of extending 
the tort limitations period from one to four years in cases of unidentified 
defendants. The state rule is outcome-determinative because a plaintiff 
amending a complaint after expiration of the original limitations period 
would have no chance of winning in federal court in the absence of such 
a rule. Likewise, if the complaint could not be amended, the defendant 
could not be sued. Federal Rule 15(c) precludes the amending of a com-
plaint if a defendant is not served with notice until after expiration of the 
limitations period. If, however, a plaintiff discovers a defendant's iden-
tity and is able to amend the original complaint within the applicable 
limitations period, no Erie conflict would exist; the result would be the 
same under both the state and Federal Rules, and the amendment would 
be permitted. 
6. FRCP 17(a) 
In Shaner v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 364 a district court addressed a 
conflict between two Federal Rules365 which permit a defendant em-
ployer to be joined as a real party in interest, and a state law366 which 
grants immunity to the employer. The court held that to include an em-
contrary state rule." Jd. at 740. This decision, by giving the Federal Rules a formi-
dable status, stands in direct contrast to the Ninth Circuit's use of Hanna in 
Olympic Sports Products, Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910 (9th 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1060 (1986). See infra notes 437-450 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Olympic Sports. 
A strange decision was handed down by a district court in Cabrales v. County 
of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 864 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 
1988), a federal question case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). In deciding 
whether to apply FRCP 15(c) or the California John Doe rule, the court explained 
that: 
Under Hanna, state statutes rarely will be held to supersede the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. This is true despite the fact that under Erie, 
where, as here, state law provides the rule of decision, the federal courts 
are to rule as would the state courts if the state courts heard the same case. 
Cabrales, 644 F. Supp. at 1358 (citations omitted). The court went on to explain 
that special concerns are present in federal question cases where state law was less 
restrictive than FRCP 15(c). Touching upon a test akin to balancing, the court 
stated that in a federal question case, the "federal policies embodied in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are entitled to even more weight than they are in a diver-
sity action." Id. at 1359. Nevertheless, relying upon Lindley and Brennan, the 
Cabrales court held that state Jaw was applicable. /d. at 1360. 
363. Brennan, 626 F. Supp. at 930. 
364. 483 F. Supp. 705 (W.D. Pa. 1980). 
365. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a), 19. 
366. 77 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 481(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987). The statute states that an 
employer is immune from suit in an action by an employee against a third party to 
recover damages arising from employment-related injuries. These types of provi-
sions are typically found in state workers' compensation laws and are designed to 
prevent third-party defendants from impleading employers on the basis of contribu-
tion and indemnity. 
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ployer as a party in the federal diversity action when that employer 
would have been immune from suit in a similar state action "would in 
every case produce a different substantive outcome" and invite forum-
shopping. 367 
The Shaner decision might be explained by the fact that courts are 
unwilling to find a validly enacted FRCP in violation of the REA. Yet, 
on the facts of Shaner, a persuasive REA argument could be made that 
joinder of the employer as a party under the Federal Rules violated the 
terms of the REA. Federal Rules 17 and 19 "regulate matters which can 
reasonably be classified as procedural"368 in that th~y regulate the litiga-
tion process by defining who is a real party and who can be joined as 
such. Immunity granted under state law serves to promote feelings of 
repose, much like statutes of limitations. A Federal Rule which strips 
away the substantive right of immunity granted to an employer under 
state law originally would "abridge, enlarge, or modify [a] substantive 
right" in violation of the REA. 
7. FRCP 17(b) 
Several cases have involved conflicts between FRCP 17(b) and state 
door-closing statutes. The Federal Rule directs the court to the appro-
priate state law in determining an individual or entity's capacity to sue or 
be sued. Courts have sometimes perceived Erie conflicts when a forum 
state's law differs from the state law which FRCP 17(b) deems applica-
ble. This REA conflict is the same as the one overlooked by the Supreme 
Court in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. 369 
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lake County 
Agriculture Society, 370 an Indiana district court insinuated that the sec-
ond prong of the REA might have been violated ifFRCP 17(b) had been 
applied. In that case, suit was brought by Hari Krishnas claiming that 
their first amendment right of free expression had been violated. 371 Indi-
ana law372 barred the plaintiff's suit because the plaintiff was a nonresi-
dent corporation, while FRCP 17(b) provided that a plaintiff's capacity 
to sue was to be governed by the state law under which the plaintiff was 
organized. 373 The court held that state law was inapplicable when sub-
367. Shaner, 483 F. Supp. at 709. 
368. Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987). 
369. 337 U.S. 535 (1949); see also supra note 260. 
370. 521 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ind. 1980), vacated and remanded, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
371. The alleged first amendment violation at issue was a decision by the Lake County 
Agricultural Society requiring that the Krishnas lease a booth at the fair for the 
purpose of disseminating religious information to the attending public. Krishna 
Consciousness, 521 F. Supp. at 11. 
372. IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-7-l.l-60(b) (Burns 1984). 
373. Because the Hari Krishnas were incorporated in New York, its law would be con-
trolling if this case were decided under FRCP 17(b). 
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ject-matter jurisdiction was based on a federal question. 374 The court 
noted, however, that if jurisdiction had been based on diversity or alien-
age, the door-closing statute would have been considered substantive 
under Hanna, producing a situation in which electing federal over state 
law would have violated the REA. 37s 
McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. CIM Associates, Inc. 376 represents one of 
the rare cases that applied both prongs of the REA. Whereas the Federal 
Rule would have required application of the law of the state of incorpo-
ration, 377 the forum state's law378 prevented a corporation from suing in 
the state courts unless it had obtained the authority to transact business 
there. 379 
The McCollum Aviation court began by explaining that the issue was 
governed by the REA. 380 
Under the Enabling Act, Rule 17(b) faces a dual test. 
First, is it a rule of practice and procedure, as authorized by the 
Act? 17(b) would meet this test. Second, the Act mandates 
that rules promulgated under its authority (i.e., the Federal 
Rules) "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive 
right. . . . " Therefore, the second prong of the test asks 
whether the Federal Rule abridges any existing substantive 
[state] right.381 
Based upon Professor Ely's analysis and the Hanna framework, the court 
found the state law to have both procedural and substantive purposes. 382 
The substantive good was to encourage business qualification for the ben-
efit of state citizens. 383 Consequently, the court held that the state rule 
must be applied over FRCP 17(b) so as not to "abridge an existing sub-
stantive right."384 This conclusion gives the McCollum Aviation court 
the distinction of being the only federal court to have found a Federal 
Rule to be in violation of the REA's second sentence. 
In Weinstock v. Sinatra, 385 a hotel owned by Frank Sinatra had been 
suspended from doing business in California for failing to meet its 
374. Krishna Consciousness, 521 F. Supp. at 12. This action was brought under 42 
u.s.c. § 1983 (1982). 
375. Krishna Consciousness, 521 F. Supp. at 11 (citing Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 
337 U.S. 535 (1949)). The court's citation to Woods was inapt since the Woods 
decision assumed that there was not a conflict involving a Federal Rule. 
376. 438 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
377. The law of the state of incorporation determines a corporation's capacity to sue. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b). . 
378. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 607.354 (West 1977). 
379. McCollum Aviation, 438 F. Supp. at 247. 
380. !d. The court also explained that outcome determination was relegated by Hanna 
solely to RDA issues. 
381. !d. 
382. !d. at 248. 
383. !d. 
384. !d. 
385. 379 F. Supp. 274 (C.D. Cal. 1974). 
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franchise tax obligations.386 Under state law, the suspension made it im-
possible for the hotel either to sue or to be sued in California courts, 
thereby giving rise to the question of whether a diversity suit could be 
maintained against the hotel in a California federal court. 387 Although 
FRCP 17(b) provides that the capacity of a corporation to be sued is 
determined under the law of the state of incorporation, the court never-
theless held that no REA conflict existed because FRCP 17(b) was appli-
cable only in federal question cases. 388 In allowing the suit to be 
brought, the court reasoned that to permit an out-of-state defendant to 
shield himself from suit behind state law would be an "anathema to the 
philosophy of Erie, which purports to eliminate 'discriminations against 
citizens of the State in favor of those authorized to invoke diversity juris-
diction of the federal courts.' " 389 Without so much as a reference to the 
RDA or REA, the court gave the hotel the option to reinstate its corpo-
rate powers or suffer a default judgment. 390 
Although the Sinatra court chose to avoid the problem, FRCP 
17(b)'s applicability in diversity cases may result in a direct conflict be-
tween that FRCP and state door-closing statutes. Federal Rule 17(b) 
directs the federal court to the law of. the state of incorporation to decide 
the issue of a party's capacity to sue or be sued. It would be possible for 
there to be no conflict, even if FRCP 17(b) applied in diversity cases, if 
the law of the state of incorporation was identical to that of the forum 
state. If, however, such a conflict were to exist, then the court would 
have to conduct a difficult REA analysis. 
The first prong of the REA is met because FRCP 17(b) is rationally 
capable of being classified as procedural-it simply directs a court to the 
applicable substantive law governing a party's capacity to sue or be sued. 
The second half of the REA, however, proves more troublesome. Profes-
sor Ely notes that a state door-closing statute is substantive because "a 
primary reason jurisdiction [is] denied by the state law [is] to encourage 
corporate qualification [to do business in the state]."391 For example, in 
Sinatra, the requirement of corporate qualification was intended to pro-
mote payment of corporate taxes. According to Ely, "[t]hat is a substan-
tive goal concerned with something other than the way litigation is to be 
managed."392 Consequently, the Federal Rule would undercut a state 
substantive goal and violat~ the second prong of the REA. 
386. Id. at 275. 
387. ld. 
388. Id. at 277. The court cited Angel v. Burlington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), and Woods v. 
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), for this proposition. But cf Ely, supra 
note 2, at 728 (FRCP 17(b) "seems to be" applicable in diversity actions). 
389. Sinatra, 379 F. Supp. at 277 (quoting Woods, 337 U.S. at 538). 
390. ld. 
391. Ely, supra note 2, at 728. 
392. Id. 
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8. FRCP 25(a)(l) 
In Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 393 the question presented was 
whether the time limits for substitution of a new party for a deceased 
party were controlled by federal or state law.394 State law permitted sub-
stitution if made within one year of the death of a party,395 while FRCP 
25(a)(l) allowed substitution within ninety days after the suggestion of 
death appeared on the record. 396 In Boggs, the substitution would have 
been time-barred under state law but permitted under FRCP 25(a)(1). 397 
While it devoted much space to its Erie analysis398 and surveyed the 
relevant cases and commentaries thoroughly, the Boggs court neverthe-
less formulated a convoluted Erie test. Although the court recognized 
that an REA analysis was required, it failed to grasp the significance of 
this conclusion and included both outcome determination and policy bal-
ancing in its REA standard. 399 The court then found balancing "diffi-
cult" to apply and likely to lead "to inconsistent results."400 Similarly, it 
rejected outcome determination, explaining that: 
Although the "outcome test" has been virtually repudiated by 
subsequent decisions, its influence on so many cases was such 
that it continues to cause difficulty, because it is inconsistent 
with the approach the Court has taken in its more recent deci-
sions, especially Hanna ... and Walker . ... 401 
The court pointed out the frequently-voiced criticism of the York out-
come determination test, namely that it was over-inclusive because 
"[a]ny rule of procedure [would] affect the outcome of a case."402 
393. 497 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Ky. 1980). 
394. /d. at 1109. 
395. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 395.278 (Baldwin 1988). 
396. Under the Federal Rules, the date of record of the death of the original party is 
immaterial. Boggs, 497 F. Supp. at 1109 n.13. 
397. /d. at 1107. 
398. /d. at 1107-24. 
399. /d. at 1109-14. 
400. /d. at 1116. It is interesting to note that the court referred to the balancing test in 
the past tense as if the test was no longer employed by federal courts. The court 
further explained that "[i]t is not clear whether Walker did not 'balance' because it 
rejected the interest analysis approach or because it found no countervailing federal 
policy to place in the scale." /d. at 1120 n. 78. The reasons Walker did not balance 
were two-fold: the balancing analysis was not the proper test to employ in the event 
there had been an RDA or an REA conflict, and the Walker Court was not con-
fronted with a direct conflict between a federal and state rule, so no Erie test was 
called for. 
401. /d. at 1114-15 (footnotes omitted). 
402. /d. at 1115. As an example of a recent "significant decision based on the outcome 
test," the Boggs court cited to Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979). 
Although Edelson relied in part on outcome determination, a large portion of the 
decision is based on policy analysis. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text 
for an analysis of the Edelson decision. 
Apparently, the court did not recognize the possibility that Edelson's policy 
analysis had been made largely irrelevant by Hanna's rejuvenation of the outcome 
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Commenting on the "present state of the law," the Boggs court 
noted that "[i]t may be more feasible to mount an expedition in search of 
the end of the rainbow or the source of the Nile than to seek a practical, 
universal test for distinguishing substance from procedure. "403 Expressly 
rejecting what it viewed as Professor Ely's REA analysis,404 the court 
embraced a hybrid of the outcome determination test405 it had earlier 
found distasteful. Applying such a test, the court held that FRCP 25(a) 
must be viewed as procedural since "immediately prior to filing the suit 
the parties would not consider this rule in evaluating their rights and 
liabilities."406 Of course, whether or not the court embraced outcome 
determination was irrelevant because this was an REA problem. 
It does not appear that the Boggs court understood how to apply the 
REA test. The court concluded that, "[u]nder [Ely's] view, a rule would 
be substantive, and subject to the limitation of the second part of the 
Enabling Act, if it has any purpose that is non-procedural, even if it also 
has a procedural purpose."407 This proposition correctly represents Ely's 
understanding of the first prong of the REA test. The Boggs court, how-
ever, reasoned that the problem with Ely's test was that any rule sub-
jected to the second prong of the REA would automatically fail to pass 
its requirements. The court failed to recognize that prior to determining 
if a FRCP abridges, enlarges or modifies a state right, the initial inquiry 
of the REA involves first determining whether the state rule in question 
is substantive. When no state substantive rights are implicated, the terms 
of the REA cannot and will not be violated. 
In a situation such as Boggs, where substitution for a deceased party 
could be made under federal but not state law, application of the Federal 
Rule appears to violate the terms of the REA. The first prong of the 
REA is satisfied because substitution for a deceased party is a procedural 
act which does not impact upon the underlying claim. But rules gov-
erning the substitution of deceased parties are intended to protecf the 
repose of decedents' estates by preventing delays in the orderly distribu-
tion of assets408 and thus such rules are also substantive, much like state 
determination test, correcting the overbreadth of the York formulation. In a note, 
the court quoted the Hanna outcome determination test, but failed to identify it as 
such. Boggs, 497 F. Supp. at 1116 n.54. In a later note, the court, with little further 
comment, cited to Ely "for advocacy of a 'rejuvenated outcome determination 
test.'" /d. at 1120 n. 78. 
403. /d. at 1118. 
404. /d. at 1119. "[T]his court hereby holds that the test proposed by Professor Ely is 
not the proper one to be applied. The test proposed by the learned commentator is 
inconsistent with Sibbach ... as reaffirmed in Hanna . ... " /d. 
405. The court's hybrid outcome determination test combined elements of Hanna's re-
fined test and Justice Harlan's Hanna concurrence: "[A] substantive rule [is] de-
fined as one which ... would be meaningful in analyzing the rights and liabilities of 
parties to a dispute if they were to settle it on the day of filing suit. ... If a rule does 
not fit this definition, it is procedural." /d. at 1120. 
406. /d. at 1121. 
407. /d. at 1119. 
408. Cheramie v. Orgeron, 434 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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statutes of limitation. If FRCP 25(a) extends the time allowed for substi-
tution beyond that permitted by state law, a substantive state right of 
repose would be enlarged by application of the Federal Rule and thus 
would violate the terms of the REA. 
9. FRCP 32 
In Frechette v. Welch,4D9 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
upheld the application of FRCP 32(a)(3)410 over a more liberal state rule 
which would have permitted a defendant to use a witness' deposition in 
lieu of actual testimony.411 The court's reasoning was sparse, however, 
apparently because the parties had not raised the REA issue.412 If they 
had, the issues would be easily resolved: the state rule, an evidentiary 
rule governing the admission of testimony in court, is purely procedural, 
and no state substantive rights were implicated. 
10. FRCP 38 
On several occasions, the Fifth Circuit has addressed an REA con-
flict involving state rules that impose mandatory penalties on unsuccess-
ful appellants and a more lenient Federal Rule that leaves imposition of 
the penalty to the court's discretion. The purpose of such penalties is to 
"penalize frivolous appeals and appeals interposed for delay ... and to 
provide 'additional damages' as compensation to the appellees for having 
to suffer the ordeal of defending the judgments on appeal."413 Initially 
viewing the conflict as one governed by the RDA, the Fifth Circuit even-
tually came to recognize that the REA controlled. 
In Proctor v. Gissendaner 414 and Walters v. Inexco Oil Co. ,415 the 
Fifth Circuit held that two state statutes,416 each imposing a penalty 
409. 621 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1980). This case was significant in that it marked the first time 
that the First Circuit recognized a distinction between REA and RDA analyses. Cf 
Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974) (failing to distinguish between 
RDA and REA tests and rejecting Ely's version of the REA). 
410. FRCP 32(a)(3) restricts the substantive use of deposition testimony to those in-
stances where the witness is unavailable for a particular reason such as death or 
illness. 
411. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 517:1 (1974). 
412. It is plausible that the parties never raised an REA issue because the First Circuit 
has yet to recognize the applicability of the REA. 
413. Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4 (1987). 
414. 587 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1979). 
415. 725 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1984). 
·416. Proctor concerned an Alabama law which added ten percent to the damages when a 
judgment was unsuccessfully appealed. ALA. CODE§ 12-22-72 (1975). Walters in-
volved an analogous Mississippi penalty of fifteen percent. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-
3-23 (Supp. 1982). The constitutionality of the Mississippi statute was upheld in 
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988). The Court held that 
the appellate penalty statute did not violate the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment since it was reasonably tailored to achieve the state's legitimate 
interests of discouraging frivolous appeals, compeusating appellees for intangible 
litigation costs, and conserving judicial resources. /d. at 80-85. 
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upon unsuccessful appellants, must be applied by a federal court.417 In 
each case, the court concluded, without applying any formal test, that 
the state law was "substantive."418 
Subsequently, recognizing that the state appellate penalties con-
flicted with FRCP 38, the Fifth Circuit overruled the Walters decision in 
Ajjholder, Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc. 419 Whereas Walters viewed the 
conflict as one requiring an RDA analysis, Ajjholder correctly found that 
a direct conflict existed between the state rule and a FRCP because,420 
unlike the state rule, FRCP 38421 precludes an automatic penalty and 
permits an appellate court to award damages against an unsuccessful ap-
pellant only when it finds an appeal to be frivolous. 422 
The Ajjholder court first determined that "[t]he 'plain meaning' of 
Rule 38 ... brings it into 'direct collision' with state law, and the analysis 
developed from Hanna must apply."423 After applying both prongs of 
the REA,424 the court concluded that the state rule could not be applied 
in federal court. The Federal Rule, the court reasoned, was procedural, 
because the "[r]ules are not to be construed either to extend or to limit 
the jurisdiction of these courts in any way."425 The "more difficult prob-
lem" facing the court "was whether rule 38 abridge[d] any 'substantive 
right,'" thus violating the second prong of the REA test.426 Dismissing 
prior cases dealing with the definition of "substantive" for RDA pur-
poses, the court recognized that what may be "substantive" for those 
purposes may not be necessarily "substantive" under the REA.427 Thus, 
Ajjholder held that the second half of the REA was not violated by appli-
cation of FRCP 38 since the state statute "was not a part of [appellant's] 
417. Proctor, 587 F.2d at 184; Walters, 725 F.2d at 1016. 
418. Proctor, 587 F.2d at 184; Walters, 725 F.2d at 1017. For the most part, state laws 
assessing a penalty for unsuccessful appeals do not affect plaintiffs. This is because 
the penalty is based on a percentage of the damage award; a losing plaintiff who 
appeals has no damage award upon which a penalty can be assessed. The only 
plaintiffs possibly concerned with these laws are those who can anticipate being 
confronted with counterclaims for damages or court imposed sanctions. These state 
laws, however, are not outcome-determinative even for these "clairvoyant" plaintiffs 
because the penalty does not affect the actual outcome. Therefore, even if an RDA 
outcome determination analysis were the proper course, neither Proctor nor Walters 
was correctly decided. These state laws probably were not outcome-determinative 
in the refined sense. Prior to the initiation of any suit, when all forums were still 
available, a plaintiff's chances of winning on the merits would be no greater regard-
less of whether these state laws were applied. 
419. 746 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1984). 
420. /d. at 308-09. 
421. The A.lfholder court referred to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, but noted 
that this rule was identical to FRCP 38. /d. at 307. 
422. "The federal rule allows the appellate courts to make the determination of when the 
penalty should apply. . . . The Mississippi statute rejects this case-by-case and on-
the-merits analysis, and ordains a mandatory penalty rule." /d. at 309. 
423. /d. 
424. This is one of few courts to apply the second prong of the REA test. 
425. Affholder, 746 F.2d at 309. 
426. /d. at 310. 
427. /d. 
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original cause of action" and therefore could not be substantive.428 
The A.ffholder court appears to have adopted Justice Harlan's defini-
tion of substantive: "Those rules of law which characteristically and rea-
sonably affect people's conduct at the stage of primary private 
activity."429 When the A.ffholder court implied that substantive laws are 
those which help create the original cause of action, it was expanding 
upon Justice Harlan's definition.43o 
In Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods,431 the Supreme Court 
found the Fifth Circuit's analysis in A.ffholder "persuasive. " 432 Con-
fronted with an "unmistakable conflict" between FRCP 38 and an Ala-
bama penalty statute,433 the Court held that the FRCP governed.434 As 
to the first prong of the REA, the Court found that "Federal Rule 38 
regulates matters which can reasonably be classified as procedural, 
thereby satisfying the constitutional standard for validity."435 Turning 
to the second prong, the Court held that the Federal Rule did not violate 
state substantive rights because its "discretionary procedure affects only 
the process of enforcing litigants' rights and not the rights them-
selves."436 Thus, since both prongs of the REA were met, FRCP 38 
overrode the Alabama statute. 
11. FRCP 4l(b) 
In Olympic Sports Products, Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co. ,437 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set out what it considered to 
be the proper "Erie test." The court was presented with the issue of 
whether to apply FRCP 4l(b) or a state rule governing the dismissal of a 
claim for lack of prosecution.438 Although the court recognized that two 
lines of Erie cases existed, it failed to identify the distinction between 
RDA and REA problems or the different standards applied in each. 
The Erie test articulated in Olympic Sports was separated into three 
parts. First, the court determined whether the federal rule439 and state 
428. /d. 
429. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 477 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Rosales v. Honda Motor 
Co., 726 F.2d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the Federal Rule did not 
abridge substantive state rights as it had no effect on "people's conduct at the stage 
of primary private activity"). 
430. According to Ely, however, Justice Harlan's definition of "substantive" was not 
broad enough because it failed to take into consideration those laws which affect an 
individual's state of mind. Such laws include statutes of limitation and various im-
munization statutes which provide a sense of repose. Ely, supra note 2, at 726. 
431. 480U.S. 1 (1987). 
432. /d. at 7. 
433. /d. 
434. /d. at 8. 
435. /d. 
436. /d. 
437. 760 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1060 (1986). 
438. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 583(b) (1976) (repealed 1984). 
439. The court used the term "federal rule" to refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, as well as all other federal rules and policies. 
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rule were "actually coextensive."440 In other words, the court queried 
whether a conflict existed. Second, if a conflict did not exist, the court 
"would then apply the Erie analysis to determine if the federal court 
should enforce the state rule."441 Finally, if the federal and state rules 
did conflict, the "Hanna analysis" was then applied.442 
The court found that since both rules were "coextensive," the 
"Hanna analysis" was applicable. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
"both section 538(b) and rule 41(b) [were] discretionary dismissal stat-
utes under which the trial court considers the housekeeping interests of 
the court and the reasonable diligence displayed by the parties."443 The 
weakness of this reasoning is that if both rules were discretionary in na-
ture and similar in effect, no Erie problem would exist, for there would be 
no conflict. The court in this case should simply have applied FRCP 
41(b) without the aid of a "Hanna analysis." 
The Olympic Sports opinion confused the Erie doctrine by combin-
ing both the REA and RDA lines of cases into a single test. According 
to the court, a Federal Rule must be applied under the "Hanna analysis" 
once it passes muster under the REA "unless the Erie considerations are 
so strong that they can justify interrupting the normal function of the 
federal court processes."444 After assuming that the Federal Rule was 
valid under the REA,445 the bulk of the court's analysis was devoted to 
determining whether "Erie considerations require [the court] to enforce 
the state rule in its place. " 446 Applying the refined outcome determina-
tion test,447 the court concluded that "it [was] difficult to conceive that a 
plaintiff, before filing a lawsuit, might choose a federal forum rather than 
a state forum in the expectation that rule 4l(b) would lead to a different 
outcome, "448 since both rules were concerned with the "post-filing con-
duct of all the parties .... " 449 Therefore, the court held, forum-shopping 
concerns were not present and FRCP 41(b) was applicable.450 This con-
clusion is sound but the Ninth Circuit could have reached the same re-
sult with far simpler means had it recognized that no REA conflict 
existed. 
440. Olympic Sports, 760 F.2d at 914. 
441. !d. 
442. /d. 
443. !d. at 915. 
444. /d. at 914-15. 
445. No REA analysis was attempted by the court because neither party raised the issue 
of the rule's validity. /d. at 916. 
446. /d. The "Erie considerations" referred to were the oft-cited "twin aims of Erie": 
"the avoidance of forum shopping and unequal administration of justice." /d. 
447. "The proper query is whether the difference between the two rules would be rele-
vant to plaintiff's initial choice of a forum." /d. 
448. !d. 
449. /d. 
450. /d. 
1989] Myth of Erie 465 
12. FRCP 47 
Perry v. Allegheny Airlines 451 presented the issue of whether FRCP 
47(a) or a state statute governing voir dire was applicable in diversity 
suits.452 A direct conflict existed between a Connecticut constitutional 
provision that gave a party the right to question each juror individually 
and a Federal Rule that permitted the court to conduct the examination 
itself. The court implicitly acknowledged and applied the first453 but not 
the second prong of the REA test, holding that FRCP 47(a) represented 
a procedural rule, "essentially 'housekeeping' in nature."454 No mention 
was made of the second prong of the test, although it seems that FRCP 
47(a) would easily pass muster under the second part of the REA. 
The jury selection process is procedural in the sense that it is a 
mechanism meant to rid the jury of bias and prejudice. Voir dire easily 
falls within Ely's definition of "procedural," since the rule is designed "to 
make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the reso-
lution of disputes."455 Consequently, FRCP 47(a) cannot be considered 
to "abridge, enlarge or modify [a state] substantive right." 
It should be noted that although the state rule was set forth in an 
amendment to the state constitution, this alone does not make the rule 
substantive. State constitutions contain both procedural and substantive 
rules. The fact that a rule is found in a constitution may give it height-
ened stature, but it does not make the rule more substantive than it 
would be if established by statute or common law.456 
13. FRCP 51 
Platis v. Stockwe/1 457 involved a conflict between FRCP 51 and a 
state common law rule which held that failure to give a specific statutory 
instruction in comparative negligence cases458 was reversible error, even 
in the absence of an objection by the parties.459 Federal Rule 51, by con-
451. 489 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1974). 
452. /d. at 1351-52. A Connecticut statute amended the state constitution to give coun-
sel an "inviolate" right to question each juror individually. CONN. CoNST. art. I, 
§ 19. 
453. The only indication the court gave that it recognized the REA test was this state-
ment: "These procedural rules [FRCP 47(a) and Federal Local Court Rule 12(c)] 
are essentially 'housekeeping' in nature. They transgress neither the terms of the 
Enabling Act, nor constitutional restrictions." Perry, 489 F.2d at 1352 (citations 
omitted). 
454. /d. 
455. See Ely, supra note 2, at 724. 
456. /d. at 724-25 n.l71. 
457. 630 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1980). 
458. The Colorado comparative negligence statute provided that the trial judge must 
instruct the jury that the plaintiff would be unable to recover if he or she was found 
to be negligent in the degree of fifty percent or greater. COLO. REv. STAT.§ 13-21-
111 (1987). 
459. Platis, 630 F.2d at 1202. 
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trast, requires that a party object at trial to the failure to give an instruc-
tion in order to preserve the error for appeal. 
The Platis court first found FRCP 51 to be "sufficiently broad" to 
conflict with the state rule.460 Applying an REA analysis, the court then 
held that "Rule 51 is within the ambit of the Enabling Act," because the 
failure to raise the objection was "not an enlargement, abridgement, or 
modification of the comparative negligence doctrine .... "461 In holding 
FRCP 51 applicable, the court reasoned that the Federal Rule was "a 
procedural directive, aimed at augmenting the fairness and efficiency of 
the litigation process in federal court."462 
The Platis decision represents an excellent example of a proper REA 
analysis, and is one of the few cases in which both prongs of the REA 
were applied. The Platis court identified the conflict, found the Federal 
Rule to be procedural, and determined that no state substantive rights 
were impinged. It then correctly concluded that application of FRCP 51 
did not violate the terms of the REA. Objection rules clearly are guide-
lines meant to govern the manner in which a trial is conducted, and con-
sequently, are by their nature procedural, even when contained within a 
substantive comparative negligence statute. 
14. FRCP 56 
In Reinke v. O'Connel/,463 the Eleventh Circuit was faced with the 
issue of whether to apply a Georgia "contrary expert opinion" rule or the 
summary judgment standard of FRCP 56. Georgia common law re-
quired a plaintiff to produce contrary expert opinion after a physician, in 
a motion for summary judgment, stated that he was not guilty of mal-
practice.464 The court identified the REA conflict and applied the fol-
lowing test: "If the subject matter of the Federal Rule [was] 'arguably 
procedural,' then the Rule [did] not overstep the REA and [was] there-
fore to be followed."465 Because the court determined that the Federal 
Rule was "arguably procedural," it held that FRCP 56 was applicable.466 
By employing only the first half of the REA, the court came to the inevi-
table conclusion that the Federal Rule must be applied.467 
Under the circumstances, however, the Reinke court did not have to 
look to the second part of the REA, which is invoked only when state 
substantive rights are implicated. The Georgia rule governed burden of 
proof, and such rules are not ones which tend to affect the primary con-
duct of state citizens, only the conduct of litigants. Consequently, state 
460. /d. at 1205. 
461. /d. at 1205-06. 
462. /d. at 1206 (quoting Ely, supra note 2, at 725). 
463. 790 F.2d 850 (lith Cir. 1986). 
464. /d. at 851. 
465. /d. 
466. /d. 
467. /d. 
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burden of proof rules are procedural, and if they conflict with FRCP 56 
they need not be applied by a federal court.46s 
15. FRCP 62(d) 
An intriguing REA problem arose in Markowitz & Co. v. Toledo 
Metropolitan Housing Authority.469 Federal Rule 62(d) imposed a super-
sedeas bond requirement on all litigants under specified conditions, while 
Ohio law470 exempted a "political subdivision" from posting such a 
bond.471 In holding that FRCP 62 "overrode" the state law, the district 
court, without an REA analysis,472 reasoned that the Federal Rule "in 
no way impinge[d] upon the substantive rights" of the appellant since 
"[j]udgment [had already] been rendered; the rights and obligations of 
the parties [had] been declared."473 
Markowitz appears to have reached the correct result. The bond 
merely affects the timing of payment of litigation costs in the federal sys-
tem. It is part of the process by which an appeal is taken, and thus, can 
readily be classified as "procedural." Similarly, a state supersedeas bond 
requirement is also a procedural rule, and a state law exempting certain 
groups from such a bond requirement is no more "substantive" than the 
bond requirement itself. The Markowitz court was correct in applying 
the Federal Rule because no state substantive rights were "abridged, en-
larged or modified." 
IV. CONCLUSION 
More than fifty years after Erie, the Erie doctrine remains in a state 
of disarray. As one Fourth Circuit district court noted in frustration, 
"[i]f there has been a spell cast by these Erie incantations . . . it has 
produced more befuddlement than enchantment."474 Furthermore, of 
the hundreds of cases involving Erie disputes which have arisen since 
468. It is interesting to note that state burden of proof rules would likely be deemed 
substantive under the RDA, since such rules tend to impact directly upon a plain-
tiff's chances of succeeding on the merits. See Ely, supra note 2, at 714. 
469. 74 F.R.D. 550 (N.D. Ohio 1977). 
470. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2505.12 (Anderson Supp. 1988). 
471. Markowitz, 74 F.R.D. at 550. 
472. The only reference made to the REA was a quotation from the Hanna opinion 
which mentioned the Enabling Act. /d. at 551 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473-74). 
473. /d. 
474. J. Aron & Co. v. Service Transp. Co., 515 F. Supp. 428, 435 n.8 (D. Md. 1981). The 
issue in A ron was whether the district court should give a prior judgment rendered 
in the same court res judicata effect under Maryland or federal law. The decision 
devoted nine full pages to a discussion on the Erie doctrine. Interestingly, the court 
noted that it was unnecessary to decide whether an Erie conflict existed. /d. at 439 
n.16. This should have been the first issue addressed, because if no conflict existed, 
an Erie analysis would have been unnecessary. See also Haislip v. Riggs, 534 F. 
Supp. 95 (W.D.N.C. 1981) (court addressed Erie/res judicata issue without assess-
ing whether any conflict between state and federal res judicata law existed). 
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1974, only a handful have employed either a RDA475 or REA476 analysis 
that arguably follows Ely's standard. Lower court Erie analyses gener-
ally consist of justifications and policy considerations, rather than inquir-
ies about outcome determination or the two prongs of the REA. This 
trend may be attributable to the fact that courts are reluctant to ex-
change the flexibility inherent in policy analysis for the complexity and 
rigidity of Professor Ely's interpretations of the RDA and REA tests. 
The RDA test employed most often is a policy analysis that courts 
have credited to Byrd. Since Byrd was decided, it has been misconstrued 
to the point where balancing no longer plays a primary role in the test. 
The present quasi-Byrd analysis usually entails an inquiry into either the 
state or federal interests behind a rule, yet stops short of actually balanc-
ing these competing interests as Byrd did. 477 Byrd requires a two-stage 
process whereby a court first decides whether the state rule at issue is 
substantive, and if so, whether the state interest behind the rule out-
weighs any countervailing federal interests.478 In application, however, 
courts usually ignore the first stage of the test and scrutinize either the 
state or the federal interests implicated, or look to extraneous interests, 
such as the policies underlying the Erie doctrine itself. 
As justification for the continued viability of Byrd,479 or even for the 
475. See Olympic Sports Prod., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (refined outcome determination as part of three-part test composed of a 
policy analysis), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1060 (1986); Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 
F.2d 1487 (lOth Cir. 1983) (refined outcome determination only); Kanouse v. West-
wood Obstetrical & Gynecological Assoc., 505 F. Supp. 129 (D.N.J. 1981) (refined 
outcome determination and policy analysis); Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 
F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (refined outcome determination along with policy 
balancing and an assortment of other tests). While three of these four courts used 
the refined test in conjunction with other analyses, Hefley was the only case in 
which the court relied solely on the refined outcome-determinative test for its RDA 
analysis. Two cases recognized refined outcome determination prior to the publica-
tion of Ely's article. See Neifeld v. Steinberg, 438 F.2d 423, 426 (3d Cir. 1971); 
Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 605 (2d Cir. 1968). 
476. Apparently there are only four cases which have applied both prongs of the REA. 
See Affholder, Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc., 746 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1984); Platis v. 
Stockwell, 630 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1980); International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness v. Lake County Agricultural Soc'y, 521 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ind. 1980), 
vacated and remanded, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983); McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. 
CIM Assocs., 438 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
477. See In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d 1189 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983); Feinstein v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 
643 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1981); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 
1979); Ilro Prod. Ltd. v. Music Fair Enter., 94 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). For an 
example of a proper use of Byrd balancing, see Masino v. Outboard Marine Corp., 
652 F.2d 330 (3d Cir. 1981); Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (Sth Cir. 1974). 
478. Another plausible interpretation is that Byrd balancing required the weighing of the 
state law's effect on the outcome against any countervailing federal interests. See 
Harrison v. Celotex Corp., 583 F. Supp. 1497 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); Chladek v. Sterns 
Transp. Co., 427 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
479. Many courts have simply assumed that Byrd balancing was the proper test, without 
considering Hanna's impact. Weiser v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 69 F.R.D. 97 
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), is representative of this class of cases. To decide whether a unani-
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proposition that Hanna marked the death-knell of outcome determina-
tion,480 courts have relied upon one of two excerpts from Hanna: (1) 
" 'outcome-determination' analysis was never intended to serve as a talis-
man;"481 and (2) "[t]he outcome-determination test ... cannot be read 
without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of 
forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the 
laws."482 But this approach requires a perverse reading of Hanna, be-
cause the quoted statements are from sections of the opinion condemning 
York, 483 and not from Hanna's discussion of how to conduct a proper 
RDA analysis.484 Rather than formulating an actual test, the Hanna 
Court was explaining that "nonsubstantial" or "trivial" disparities be-
tween state and federal rules, which could be outcome-determinative 
under the York test, were not the type of variations with which Erie was 
concerned. Ironically, in the footnote immediately following the "twin 
aims of Erie" language, the Court appears to have abandoned the Byrd 
policy analysis altogether.4ss 
The continued popularity of Byrd in the lower federal courts stems 
from the fact that it contains the least restrictive RDA test, but the stan-
dard has evolved into a policy analysis that has allowed courts to free-
lance to an extent certainly not envisioned by the Supreme Court. Byrd 
has become a catch-all authority for any Erie "test" remotely related to 
policy analysis. The judicial leeway which policy analysis affords is un-
derstandably attractive to judges who on a regular basis must reconcile 
the competing interests of separate sovereigns. But by its very nature, 
policy analysis tends to produce widely varied results, as individual 
judges, in varying contexts where different factors are salient, assign 
weights to the various state and federal interests implicated.486 A good 
mous jury verdict was required in diversity cases, the court stated that "the question 
is one that appears to be controlled by the principles enunciated by the Court in 
Byrd." Weiser, 69 F.R.D. at 101; see also Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., 726 F.2d 
259 (5th Cir. 1984); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1983); In. 
re Air Crash Disaster, 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983); 
Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979); Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 
F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975); Hibbs v. Yashar, 522 F. 
Supp. 247 (D.R.I. 1981); Kreindler v. Marx, 85 F.R.D. 612 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Byrnes 
v. Kirby, 453 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1978); Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 
(D.R.I. 1978). 
480. Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974). 
481. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-67. 
482. !d. at 468. 
483. !d. at 468-69. 
484. Ely, supra note 2, at 717 n.130. 
485. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9. 
486. Balancing places excessive discretion in the hands of judges, and in the process, 
decreases the likelihood of consistent results. 
The difficulty in applying the Byrd test probably stemmed from the fact 
that there is no scale in which the balancing process called for by that case 
can take place. There is no way to say with assurance in a particular case 
that the federal interest asserted is more or less important than the interest 
in preserving uniformity of result with the state court. Even if there were 
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example of the arbitrary nature of policy analysis may be found in a com-
parison of the tests employed in In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, 
Illinois on May 25, 1979,487 and in the lower court opinion it overturned. 
At the appellate level, the Seventh Circuit held that, although state law 
did not require that the jury receive instructions on the tax consequences 
of personal injury awards, a federal common law rule which required 
that the jury receive such an instruction must be applied. 488 The Seventh 
Circuit's decision was based on state policy interests, which the court 
fouod to be procedural.489 This decision overturned a district court rul-
ing which had reached the opposite conclusion using a similar analytical 
framework:490 failure to apply state law would violate the twin policy 
concerns underlying Erie.491 · The appellate court looked to the policy 
interests behind the state rule; the lower court scrutinized the policies 
promoted by the Erie doctrine itself. 
Another route many courts have taken to solve RDA conflicts is to 
use Hanna's "twin aims of Erie" language as a test in and of itself. Such 
a mode of analysis is clearly incorrect because the "twin aims" represent 
motives behind the Erie doctrine, not an actual test. Outcome determi-
nation is meant to provide courts with the means to assess whether fail-
ure to apply a state law would lead to result-oriented forum-shopping. 
Thus the refined outcome determination test protects the underlying pol-
icies of the Erie doctrine, and it is fruitless for a court to apply the poli-
cies to a problem in lieu of the test itself. 
Several methodologies have been employed by courts confronted 
with REA disputes. One type of analysis gives the Federal Rules an in-
vincible quality by treating them as exceptions to the Erie rule or as per 
se applicable under Hanna. Many courts, particularly those of the Tenth 
Circuit, have read Hanna to mandate per se application of a Federal 
Rule in conflict with a state rule.492 Courts relying on such reasoning 
have applied no analysis and occasionally have even failed to mention the 
REA.493 Varying the per se approach, a few courts have viewed the Fed-
such a scale, the weights to be put in it must be whatever the judges say 
they are. 
C. WRIGHT, supra note 19, § 59, at 382-83. 
487. 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983). 
488. /d. at 1200. 
489. /d. at 1199-1200. 
490. In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 526 F. Supp. 226 
(N.D. Ill. 1981), rev'd, 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983). 
491. /d. 
492. See, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 797 (lOth Cir. 1980) (Wyoming 
practice is irrelevant because Hanna requires "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure control this diversity action even where there exists a conflict"), cert. denied, 
450 U.S. 918 (1981); American Bankers Ins. v. Colorado Flying Academy, 93 
F.R.D. 135, 137 (D. Colo. 1982) ("even if Colorado law did dictate a contrary re-
sult," FRCP 15(c) is per se applicable); Saraniero v. Safeway, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 
749, 751 (D. Kan. 1982) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... apply to all 
diversity cases even if they directly conflict with competing state cases."). 
493. See, e.g., Santana v. Holiday Inn~, Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 1982) (Hanna 
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eral Rules as falling within the purview of the exceptions clause of the 
RDA: state substantive law applies "except where the Constitution or 
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or 
provide."494 Treating the Federal Rules as exceptions to the general rule 
of Erie again results in their automatic application.495 
The most common approach taken by courts to resolve conflicts in-
volving the REA has been to formulate standards which have utilized 
one or a number of elements borrowed from the RDA line of cases. Ig-
noring Hanna's mandate that only the REA is applicable to conflicts in-
volving Federal Rules, courts often delve into an assortment of factors, 
including interest analyses and outcome determination.496 Thus if the 
REA is relied upon at all, it is in conjunction with RDA tests. Some 
courts, however, have relied solely on the REA but have failed to apply 
the second prong of the test.497 Since all the Federal Rules have an ar-
guably procedural purpose, such an approach also results in per se appli-
cation of the Federal Rules by failing to inquire whether such FRCP 
abridges, enlarges or modifies a state-created substantive right. 
demands application of Federal Rules in conflict with state rules); Seltzer v. Ches-
ley, 512 F.2d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 1975) (without mentioning the REA or applying 
any analysis, the court held FRCP 51 to be applicable based on Hanna); Welch v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 466 F.2d 1344, 1345 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying FRCP 
l5(c) due to the "strong presumption" established by the Supreme Court that the 
Federal Rules control); Thomas v. Mitchell-Bradford Chern. Co., 582 F. Supp. 
1373, 1375 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying FRCP l5(c) without an REA analysis). 
494. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1982). 
495. For example, in Kuzmickey v. Dunmore Corp., 420 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1976), 
the court was faced with a conflict between FRCP 23.1, which governed the practice 
and pleading of derivative actions in federal courts, and an analogous state rule. 
Finding that application of the Federal Rule "[fell] within the exception clause of 
the Rules of Decision Act," the court noted that the Federal Rule must be applied. 
/d. at 230 n.9. 
In Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975), a district court also consid-
ered the Federal Rules to be "exceptions" to the general Erie rule. After explaining 
that Erie required application of substantive state law in a diversity action, the dis-
trict court stated: "various exceptions to this general rule have been carved out, for 
example, where the particular issue substantially affects the distributions of trial 
functions between judge and jury (citing Byrd) or where the issue is specifically 
covered by the Federal Rules or federal law (citing Hanna)." /d. at 94. 
496. See, e.g., Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(relying on a three factor test in holding a state rule to be applicable over FRCP 
4(h): forum-shopping concerns, equal protection under the laws, and federalism); 
Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (in 
federal question cases, federal rules must be given added weight in any policy bal-
ancing); Richards & Assocs. v. Boney, 604 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (in hold-
ing FRCP 8(a)(2) applicable, the court looked to policy concerns underlying the 
state rule); Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Ky. 1980) 
(employing policy balancing and outcome determination in holding FRCP 25(a)(l) 
applicable); Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(considering, among other factors, whether FRCP l5(c) was consistent with the 
policies underlying a state rule). 
497. See, e.g., Reinke v. O'Connell, 790 F.2d 850 (lith Cir. 1986); Ringrose v. Engelberg 
Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1982); Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, 489 F.2d 
1349 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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Why the Erie doctrine is in such a state of disorder is difficult to 
determine. Erie is not one of the more glamorous legal doctrines. Its 
intricacy and highly technical nature may lead many parties to overlook 
it, others to misunderstand it, and courts to avoid it. The manner in 
which the Erie doctrine has evolved has also contributed, in large part, to 
the lack of comprehension and uniformity throughout the federal system. 
The principal Supreme Court cases-Erie, York, Byrd and Hanna-
were each attempts to patch up problems associated with earlier forms of 
the Erie test. This corrective measures approach has resulted in the pil-
ing up of successive bricks on top of an already shaky foundation. Lower 
federal courts have been left with the responsibility of sifting through the 
wreckage to select the applicable Erie test: substance-procedure, out-
come determination, policy balancing, refined outcome determination, or 
the two-prong REA test. Rather than choosing a single standard, courts 
have tended to fabricate analyses of their own. These homemade Erie 
tests often fail to distinguish between RDA and REA problems498 and 
are concocted by combining several standards into one construct. 499 
Stare decisis often plays a role by binding later courts to earlier versions 
of incorrect analyses. 500 
498. See, e.g., Olympic Sports Prod., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910 
(9th Cir. 1985); Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 
1976); Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974); Richards & Assocs. v. 
Boney, 604 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D.N.C. 1985); Covel v. Safetech, 90 F.R.D. 427 (D. 
Mass. 1981); Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Ky. 1980); 
Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). 
499. See Weitz Co. v. Mo-Kan Carpet, 723 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Edelson v. 
Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979) (combining York outcome determination with 
the policy factors derived from Erie and Byrd); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603 
F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979) (employing Byrd balancing in conjunction with York out-
come determination and Hanna's "twin aims of Erie"); Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef 
Sys., Inc., 554 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (balancing state and federal policy inter-
ests to give effect to the policies underlying Erie); Palmer v. Ford Motor Co., 498 
F.2d 952 (lOth Cir. 1974) (using Byrd balancing, York outcome determination, the 
"twin aims of Erie" and the state interest behind application of a FRCP to resolve 
an RDA issue); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965) (ap-
plying a three-part analysis derived from components of York and Byrd); Harrison 
v. Celotex Corp., 583 F. Supp. 1497 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (balancing the outcome-
determinative effect of state rules against the federal policy interest implicated and 
also relying on the "twin aims of Erie"); W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, UNDER-
STANDING CONFLICTS OF LAWS 260 ( 1985) (RDA test consists of outcome determi-
nation and policy balancing). 
500. The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits are particularly illustrative of this phe-
nomenon. Although precedents have been respected, district courts have ques-
tioned the validity of the courses they were bound to follow. Sylvestri v. Warner & 
Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968), which held that FRCP 3 controlled the 
time of commencement for purposes of state limitations periods, was adhered to by 
Second Circuit district courts amidst questions concerning Sylvestri's correctness. 
See, e.g., Zarcone v. Condie, 62 F.R.D. 563, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (questioning 
whether Sylvestri had been correctly decided, but explaining that precedent bound 
the court to the decision). 
Similarly, courts of the Fourth Circuit have religiously followed the pre-Hanna 
opinion, Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965). The validity 
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The federal system's use of the Erie doctrine does not conform to 
Ely's formulation. If a test's validity could be measured by its use, then 
refined outcome determination is certainly not the appropriate standard 
for RDA purposes. Rather, policy analysis in one form or another, 
which ranks as the most popular test for resolving both RDA and REA 
conflicts, would be the proper RDA test based on popularity. 
Despite the popularity of policy analyses, there is a major problem 
inherent in such tests. As Hanna explained, "[o]ne cannot meaningfully 
ask how important ... [a state rule] is without first asking 'important for 
what purpose?' " 501 Hanna clearly indicated that the most significant 
"purpose" was to prevent opportunities for affecting the final outcome of 
the litigation through the initial choice offorum. 502 The refined outcome 
determination test took into account this important point, one which 
most lower courts have yet to grasp. 
There are several reasons why refined outcome determination has 
failed to attract support. First, the test, if it exists at all, exists only by 
way of dictum from Hanna, and it was not until Professor Ely's article 
that the subtleties of the test were brought to light. Second, outcome 
determination is often extremely difficult to apply. An after-the-fact de-
termination of the litigants' pre-trial ability to increase their chances of 
victory through forum-shopping requires one to look to the past in order 
to predict the odds for success in the future. Third, outcome determina-
tion is rigid and is incapable of offering solutions to all RDA problems. 
Because "outcome" is only measured in terms of the potential for vic-
tory, the test fails to weigh the impact of forum-shopping on other results 
such as additional monetary awards. Finally, refined outcome determi-
nation may be disfavored because it fails to "adequately accommodate[ ] 
all of the significant social interests to be served by both Erie and the 
[RDA]."503 Such interests are steeped in federalism, because outcome 
determination may be overly protective of federal interests at the expense 
of the states. 
For Erie conflicts invoking the REA, the two-pronged test has 
proven almost as troublesome to courts as its RDA counterpart. 
Although Hanna expressly bifurcated Erie conflicts into RDA and REA 
of Szantay, which held that state door-closing statutes were inapplicable in federal 
court under Erie, was also questioned. See, e.g., Rollins v. Proctor & Schwartz, 
Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1137,1152 (D.S.C. 1979), rev'd, 634 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1980) 
(reluctantly applying Szantay). 
In the Eighth Circuit, Prasher v. Volkswagen, 480 F.2d 947, 954 (8th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 994 (1974), which held that FRCP 3 determined when 
a state limitations period began to run, controlled for almost a decade until the 
court of appeals corrected itself after the Supreme Court's decision in Walker. In 
fact, after Walker, but before the Eighth Circuit overturned its earlier precedent, 
one district court recognized Walker but felt compelled to follow Prasher. Walden 
v. Tulsair Beechcraft, 96 F.R.D. 34, 41 (W.O. Ark. 1982). 
501. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9. 
502. /d. at 468-69. 
503. Redish & Phillips. supra note 4, at 372. 
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problems, courts appear reluctant to recognize the REA's exclusive ap-
plicability to issues involving Federal Rules. This may be due in part to 
the fact that Hanna represented, until recently, the Supreme Court's only 
expression of an REA analysis, and the Court has yet to accord the 
REA's second prong any significance. The lower courts have been left 
largely to their own devices in applying the second half of the test. Fur-
thermore, courts may have difficulty in grasping the subtle differences 
between the meaning of the term "substantive" in the REA and RDA 
contexts. Finally, courts are naturally reluctant to find a FRCP in viola-
tion of the REA. This reluctance may account for the fact that only one 
court appears to have held a FRCP violative of the terms of the REA. 504 
Not since Byrd has the Supreme Court decided a case invoking the 
RDA, and little has been added since Hanna's demonstration of the 
REA analysis. 505 Much of the current confusion is due to both the lack 
of recent guidance and the reluctance of the Supreme Court to expressly 
overrule earlier versions of the Erie test. Although Professor Ely appears 
to have accurately described the current Erie standards, courts are never-
theless adamantly clinging to policy analyses purportedly verboten by 
Hanna. Thus, there has been a uniform failure of federal courts to accept 
either refined outcome determination or the two-pronged REA analysis. 
The current chaos of Erie in the federal courts makes the time ripe for 
Supreme Court reexamination of the doctrine. 
504. See McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. CIM Assocs., 438 F. Supp. 245, 248 (S.D. Fla. 
1977), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 376-384. 
505. Recall that in Walker the Court found no conflict to exist between FRCP 3 and a 
similar state rule; thus, no REA analysis was mandated. 
